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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CHARLES MOA, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20090882-SC 
I 
Petitioner is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
^_ 
This is a consolidated appeal. See Addendum A. In casje no. 031903971, Moa was 
i 
convicted of one count of Discharging a Firearm Toward a Building, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (2003). See Addendum B. In case no. 
071904352, Moa was convicted of one count each of Discharging a Firearm From a 
i 
Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2007), 
Failure to Respond, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-210 
(2005), and Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-103 (2003).1 See Addendum C. The court of appeals issuU State v. Moa, 2009 UT App 
231, 220 P.3d 162, on August 27, 2009. See Addendum D. This Court granted a writ of 
certiorari on January 28, 2010. See Addendum E. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(5) (Supp. 2009) and 78A-4-105 (2008). 
This consolidated appeal includes convictions under botbj the 2003 and Supp. 2007 
versions of section 76-10-508. No changes made to sectiojn 76-10-508 between 2003 and 
2007 affect the merits of this appeal. For the convenience! of the Court, therefore, citations 
to section 76-10-508 in this brief refer to the 2007 versionj of the statute. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: " Whether the court of appeals erred in holding [Moa] failed to demonstrate 
plain error in the acceptance of his guilty plea as to district court case number 031903971." 
Order dated Jan. 28, 2010. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of 
appeals and not that of the [trial] court," and it reviews "the decision of the court of appeals 
for correctness." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ |25, 63 P.3d 650 (quotation and citation 
omitted). "c[W]hether the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. . . . The trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed for 
clear error.'" Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at %3 (quoting State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, [^9, 22 
P.3d 1242). In this case, the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's decision for plain 
error. "Under the plain error doctrine, we reverse where the defendant 'establishes] that (i) 
an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful.... '" Id (quoting State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tfl5, 95 P.3d 276). 
Issue 2: "Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
imposition of consecutive sentencing." Order dated Jan. 28, 2010. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at^|25 (quotation and citation omitted). 
The court of appeals reviewed this issue for an abuse of discretion. See Moa, 2009 UT App 
231 at 1J4 (citing State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^66, 52 P.3d 1210). "The trial court abuses its 
discretion when it fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed 
exceeds the limits prescribed by law." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at TJ66 (citations omitted). 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are determinative of the issues on appeal: Uijiited States Constitution 
i 
Amendment XIV; Utah Constitution Article I, § 7; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2007); and Utah R. Crim. P. 11. iee Addendum F. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal is a consolidation of the two cases. First, in cjase no. 031903971, Moa 
was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, a second degree felony.2 R. 3971 (1-
3). On May 25, 2007, Moa entered a no-contest guilty plea to one count of discharging a 
firearm toward a building, a third degree felony, in violation of (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
j 
508(2). R. 3971 (71-72; 226:1-2, 8); see Addendum G (plea ccjlloquy); Addendum H 
(guilty plea affidavit). The trial court then ordered Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) to 
prepare a presentence report (PSR). R. 3971 (71; 85; 226:12-13). On June 15 and 22, 2007, 
Moa filed pro se motions to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 3971' (101; 103). Defense counsel 
also filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. R. 3971 (120J 127). The trial court denied 
the motions. R. 3971 (186; 195-96; 199; 227:21-22); see Addendum I. Thereafter, the trial 
court sentenced Moa to a term of three to five years in prison. R. 3971 (234:34-35). 
Second, in case no. 071904352, Moa was charged wijh seven counts of discharging a 
firearm toward a building, a third degree felony; and one count each of failure to respond to 
i 
an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, aggravated! assault, a third degree felony, 
2
 Hereinafter, case no. 031903971 will be referred to as ca^e no. 3971. Citations to the 
record for this case will be to R. 3971 followed by the record page in parentheses. 
3 
and failure to stop, a class A misdemeanor.3 R. 4352 (2-7). On November 13, 2007, Moa 
pleaded guilty to one count each of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a third degree 
felony; failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; and aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony. R. 4352 (73-74; 75-81; 121). The trial court then ordered 
AP&P to prepare a PSR. R. 4352 (73). On January 11, 2008, the trial court sentenced Moa 
to serve three to five years on the discharge of a firearm charge, zero to five years on the 
failure to respond charge, and zero to five years on the aggravated assault charge. R. 4352 
(90-91; 122:6-7). It ran the sentences "consecutive to each other and all consecutive to any 
other commitment that Mr. Moa might have." R. 4352 (91; 122:7); see Addendum J. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Statement of Facts Related to Case No. 3971. 
"On April 4, 2003, Moa and two other individuals allegedly discharged firearms 
toward three people in a business parking lot." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at {^6; see R. 3971 
(2-3). "Moa was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, a second degree felony." 
Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at TJ6; see R. 3971 (1-3). At his initial appearance, the information 
containing these charges was read and a copy was given to Moa. R. 3971 (5). "Moa was 
appointed an attorney, who withdrew because of a conflict and new counsel was appointed." 
Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at ^6; see R. 3971 (5-6; 30; 32). "On the day of his preliminary 
hearing, Moa alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and moved to have yet another 
attorney appointed." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at ^6; see R. 3971 (36-37; 234:3-7). "The 
3
 Hereinafter, case no. 071904352 will be referred to as case no. 4352. Citations to the 
record for this case will be to R. 4352 followed by the record page in parentheses. 
4 
trial court granted the motion, continued the hearing, and appointed James Valdez." Moa, 
I 
2009 UT App 231 at \6; see R. 3971 (36-37; 39; 41; 234:8, 12). 'Weeks later, Valdez also 
requested permission to withdraw on the basis of a conflict and mjoved to continue the 
preliminary hearing." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at %6; see R. 39711(50; 234:14-15). "The 
trial court granted this motion and appointed Manny Garcia." Mjba, 2009 UT App 231 at 
f6; see R. 3971 (50; 55; 63; 67; 234:16). "While represented byjGarcia, Moa entered a no-
contest guilty plea to one count of discharging a firearm toward k building, a third degree 
felony." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at %6; see R. 3971 (71-72; 226:1-2, 8). 
"At the plea hearing, the State clarified the written plea Agreement, stating that it 
would dismiss the three aggravated assault charges, that Moa Would be released that day, 
and that it would recommend probation unless Moa failed to obtain a [PSR] or committed 
any further crimes prior to sentencing." Moa, 2009 UT App 2p 1 at ^7; see R. 3971 (75; 
226:1-2). "The trial court made a few changes to the information by interlineation and the 
State agreed to submit an amended information reflecting the new charge, which it did two 
and a half weeks later." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at ft; see RJ 3971 (98-100; 226:4-6). 
"During the plea colloquy, the attorneys, trial court, and Moa discussed Moa's 
charges." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at «J8; see R. 3971 (226:4f5). "[Njeither counsel readily 
recalled the code section under which Moa was being charged." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at 
TJ8; see R. 3971 (226:4-5). Once the attorneys identified th^ S code section, the judge asked 
defense counsel whether he "had a chance to explain" the deal to Moa. R. 3971 (226:5). 
Defense counsel said, "Yes, Your Honor," but clarified thaft he "took over this case after . . . 
Valdez had already arranged this [plea bargain] and I just ^reiterated it all and have gone over 
it again with [Moa] and I believe that this is our understanding of the deal." R. 3971 
(226:5); seeMoa, 2009 UTApp 231 at Tf9. "Moa agreed." Id; see R. 3971 (226:5-6). 
"When asked for the factual predicate for the charge, defense counsel stated 'Judge, 
apparently on or about the 4th of April 2003 Mr. Moa, as a party, intentionally and 
knowingly discharged a firearm toward a building in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
That's what is written down here as the element and the facts, Your Honor.'" Moa, 2009 
UT App 231 at T[8; see R. 3971 (226:6). Defense counsel's reference was to the plea 
affidavit. R. 3971 (226). That affidavit listed the elements of the offense as: "'76-10-508 
On or about 4/4/2003 defendant as a party intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm 
from a vehicle toward [building] in [Salt Lake] County State of Utah.' (strikeout in 
original)." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at [^8; see R. 3971 (76). The affidavit also provided this 
factual basis: "Defendant on the date and time was a party to the discharge of firearm within 
600 feet of [building] w/out person towards the direction of people." R. 3971 (76).4 "The 
trial court repeatedly asked Moa if he understood the charges and the procedure. Moa 
indicated that he did." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at «J9; see R. 3971 (226:6). 
"At the time Moa allegedly committed the crime, Utah Code section 76-10-508 
provided that it was a class B misdemeanor for a person to 'discharge any kind of dangerous 
weapon or firearm . . . within 600 feet of . . . a house, dwelling, or any other building.'" 
Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at [^10 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a)(vii)(A), (2)). 
"Section 76-10-508 further provided that it was a third degree felony with a minimum 
4
 The factual basis in the affidavit is handwritten and difficult to decipher. See R. 3971 (76). 
The reproduction of the factual basis provided here, therefore, is appellate counsel's best 
interpretation of the actual written document. For this Court's comparison, a copy of the 
affidavit is provided in Addendum H. 
6 
sentence of three years if the actor discharged the firearm 'with intent to intimidate or 
harass another.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(bf) (emphasis in original) 
(footnote omitted). "The trial court mistakenly informed Moa that a third degree felony was 
punishable by zero to five years in the state prison, but the attorneys corrected the court, and 
the court then correctly told Moa that the offense was punishable)by three to five years." 
Id.; see R. 3971 (226:10). "Neither the colloquy nor the plea affidavit referred to a specific 
subsection of 76-10-508." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at <|10; see k. 3971 (226). "Likewise, 
they did not include subsection (2)(b)'s language, 'with intent tqi intimidate or harass 
i 
another.'" Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at f 10; see R. 3971 (226). '[The trial court also told 
Moa that if he were convicted of the three original second-degrte felony charges of 
aggravated assault, and the sentences were ordered to run consecutively, he 'could be 
looking at 45 years.'" Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at ^10; see R. 3971 (226:10). 'The trial 
court accepted Moa's no-contest plea, ordered a [PSR], and orpered Moa released to Pretrial 
Services." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at f 10; see R. 3971 (71; 8£; 226:12-13). 
"On May 31, 2007, the State moved to revoke Moa's pretrial release because Moa 
did not report to Pretrial Services." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 it f 11; see R. 3971 (87-88). 
"On June 9, 2007, the events leading to case # 4352 occurred." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at 
^11; see R. 4352(2-7). 
"On June 15 and 22, 2007, Moa filed pro se motions to withdraw his no-contest plea 
I 
based on different issues than those now raised on appeal." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at <|12; 
see R. 3971 (101; 103). Moa asked to withdraw his guilty plea because Garcia: 
failed to object to the charges on the 25th of May wljen on my plea deal I was to 
receive the same deal as my co-defendant witch [sic}] was 236 days jail, "CTS," 
sentence same day to probation, no [PSR], 36 months probation, and a 0-5 not a 3-
5[.] [M]y lawyer failed to object to these changes the prosecution made at the last 
minute when we came in front of the judge. I was really confused when I was up 
there and thought my lawyer had everything under controle [sic]. I seen him today 
and he has advised me that this is what I had to do. The pro-se motion to withdraw 
my plea and release Mr. Garcia as my lawyer for ineffective assistance of counsel on 
the grounds that he failed to object to the sudden changes in our plea agreement that 
the prosecutor started throwing at us when we were talking to Judge Kennedy. 
R. 3971 (103) (emphases omitted). Further: Moa complained: 
I took that deal on the 25th of May and on the 31st the D.A. filed new charges 
on me saying that I retaliated against a witness or informant on March 1, [20]07 two 
months before I took the deal. . . . So the D.A. filed these charges after I took deal 
hopeing [sic] to send me to prison for violating my probation. 
R. 3971 (101). 
"Subsequently, Garcia moved to withdraw and was replaced with Moa's fifth 
attorney, Robin Ljungberg," who filed a motion to withdraw Moa's guilty plea based on 
Moa's already-stated complaints. Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at T|12; see R. 3971 (113; 120; 
127). "At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, [Ljungberg] stipulated 
there was full compliance with the provisions of rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at [^12; see R. 3971 (227:7). "At that hearing, Garcia 
testified that Valdez had prepared the plea affidavit and described why the changes were 
made." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at^|12; seeR. 3971 (227:10-14, 17). "The trial court 
denied Moa's motion to withdraw his guilty plea." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at *f 12; see R. 
3971 (186; 195-96; 199; 227:21-22). "The trial court's written Findings of Fact included: 
1. The parties stipulated that the plea taken on May 25, 2007 was taken in 
compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
3. The court finds Mr. Garcia to be a credible witness. 
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4. The court finds that based on Mr. Moa's physical demeaifior and his 
responsiveness to questions, Mr. Moa was aware of what w|as happening 
during the proceedings. 
5. The [c]ourt finds that all involved parties took measures (to ensure that Mr. 
Moa understood what was occurring, especially in light offche numerous 
changes in attorneys that Mr. Moa had on this case. 
"The trial court concluded that 4[t]he defendant's plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and 
I 
intelligently made.5" Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at ^12; seeR. 397<1 (195-96). 
[ 
Thereafter, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. R. 3971 (234:29-35). The PSR 
recommended that Moa be sentenced to prison "and that this ca^e run consecutive to any 
i 
other case, which is pending." R. 3971 (112:2). The court sentenced Moa to three to five 
years in prison. R. 3971 (234:34-35). Moa timely appealed. RL 3971 (205-06). 
On appeal, Moa "assert[ed] that the trial court violated rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure by failing to ensure that [he] understood all the elements of the crime, 
specifically the penalty-enhancing element of intent to intimidate or harass another."' Moa, 
2009 UT App 231 at ^[13. He raised this issue under the doctrines of plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at ^3. The court of appeals "agree[d] with Moa that an 
I 
error occurred" and that "the error should have been obvious to both the court and counsel 
because the statute was unambiguous." Id. at ^15. Regardless, it affirmed because it 
concluded that Moa did not show the error was harmful. Id. at Tfl7 & n.4. 
In reaching this decision, the court of appeals "recognize[d] that a defendant's 
I 
understanding and knowledge of the elements of the crime to which he is pleading no 
contest is an important part of the process." Id at f^ IT. Regardless, the court affirmed 
T 
because "Moa has not established that he would have refused to enter his plea if he had been 
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informed correctly of the elements.55 Id. "Moa clearly knew his plea was to a felony and 
also knew the potential sentence was three to five years.55 Id. at %\6. Further, the record 
shows that Moa was motivated to plead guilty because he "was particularly anxious that he 
did not have to be incarcerated and would be released immediately.55 Id 
B. Statement of Facts Related to Case No. 4352. 
Moa was charged with seven counts of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a third 
degree felony; and one count each of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third 
degree felony, aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and failure to stop, a class A 
misdemeanor. R. 4352 (2-7). The charges stemmed from allegations that on June 9, 2007, 
Moa drove a vehicle from which the passenger discharged a firearm toward a residence and 
vehicle, failed to stop at an officer's signal, drove into a patrol vehicle during the ensuing 
chase, and fled on foot once officers stopped the vehicle. R. 4352 (6). On November 13, 
2007, Moa pleaded guilty to one count each of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, failure 
to respond to an officer's signal to stop, and aggravated assault, third degree felonies. R. 
4352 (73-74; 75-81; 121). He did not move to withdraw this plea. See R. 4352. 
In his statement for the PSR, Moa admitted that he "got into a car that a firearm was 
discharged from," "failed to stop and lost controle [sic] of my car ran into the curb me and 
the officer both that['s] when our cars made contact resulting in the agg assault.55 R. 4352 
(PSR: 4). He said he is "truely [sic] sorry to the public, my family and everyone that was 
effected by my actions.55 R. 4352 (PSR: 4). He plans to "start living a positive healthy life,55 
"get back into church,55 and "go back to school.55 R. 4352 (PSR: 4). He has "a family that 
cares about55 him and that he is "going to use55 his time in prison to learn so that he will 
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"never come back." R. 4352 (PSR: 4). And he wants to live his life so as to "prove" to 
I 
himself and his family "that [he] can make a change." R. 4352 (PSR: 4). 
The PSR recommended that Moa be sentenced to prison and that "this case run 
consecutive to case no. 3971 and that each count in this case run consecutive." R. 4352 
(PSR:2). It also provided Moa's criminal history. It said that Mc^ a was "a documented 
I 
member of the Tongan Crip Gang" and "was at one time considered Public Enemy Number 
One." R. 4352 (PSR:6). As a juvenile, he was charged with aggravated assault and 
disorderly conduct, but the disposition is unclear because he failed to appear. R. 3971 
I 
(112:6). His adult history included multiple misdemeanor charges (several of which were 
I 
ultimately dismissed); felony convictions from Utah for theft, damage to jails, and 
discharging a firearm toward a building (case no. 3971); and felony convictions from 
Washington State for robbery and assault. R. 3971 (112:6-7); 4352 (PSR:5-6). He also had 
an active warrant in Washington State for a parole violation. R. 3971 (112:7). 
In a letter filed on December 5, 2007, Moa asked the court to impose concurrent 
sentences because "I'm changing my life." R. 4352 (86). He said he is "truly sorry to the 
I 
public, [his] family and all of the people that have been affectbd from [his] actions." R. 
4352 (86). He intends to use his time in prison to "change [his] life for the better." R. 4352 
(86). When he is released, he intends to go "back to church.' R. 4352 (86). He also wants 
l 
to work with troubled youth and "start a family of [his] own.r R. 4352 (86). 
I 
At the sentencing hearing, Moa asked the trial court t£> run the sentences "concurrent 
with each other even if you want to run it consecutive to [his] other commitment." R. 4352 
(122:4). In response, the State asked for consecutive sentencing. R. 4352 (122:5). It 
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argued that Moa was "extremely dangerous55 and that there were many victims in this case 
because all the citizens in the "whole neighborhood" were victims. R. 4352 (122:6). 
Further, in addition to describing the event that led to the charges, the prosecutor described 
these earlier incidents: 
[Tjhere was a murder in front of that home in February. One of the bullets 
went into the [] home and hit a young girl in the head. . . . It didn't kill her, 
luckily. 
Mr. Moa gets released from custody. Within two days, there's a 
shooting again at this home. 
Neighbors come out, there's [sic] some witnesses, not enough to put 
together a case but police are looking for Mr. Moa. 
R. 4352 (122:5). 
When it imposed sentence, the trial court said it saw "Moa as an extreme danger to 
any community." R. 4352 (122:6). It sentenced Moa to serve three to five years on the 
discharge of a firearm charge, zero to five years on the failure to respond charge, and zero to 
five years on the aggravated assault charge. R. 4352 (90-91; 122:6-7). It also ordered the 
sentences to run "consecutive to each other and all consecutive to any other commitment." 
R. 4352 (91; 122:7). Moa timely appealed. R. 4352 (93-94; 106-12). 
On appeal, Moa argued "the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences 
was an abuse of discretion." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at «f 19. Specifically, he asserted "that 
the trial court erred in considering" the State's arguments "because it failed to limit its 
consideration to the actual number of victims and there is no indication in the record that 
[Moa] was charged with or convicted of the incidents described." Id. The court of appeals 
affirmed "because the record does not support [Moa's] claim that the trial court actually 
relied on either of the prosecutor's statements." Id. at ^ |20. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision in case no. 3971. 
The court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court committed obvious error 
when it accepted Moa's guilty plea without ensuring that Moa understood the nature 
and elements of the offense or the factual basis for the plea. The (court of appeals, 
however, incorrectly determined that the error was not reversible under the plain 
error doctrine because it was not harmful. The harm in this case was self-evident 
because the trial court's acceptance of the plea violated Moa's substantial due 
process rights and entered a conviction that was not supported by sufficient evidence 
I 
i 
or an adequate admission. Further, although not necessary, the record shows a 
reasonable probability that but for the due process violation, Mpa would have 
rejected the plea bargain and proceeded to trial. 
Second, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision in case no. 4352. 
The State made two improper arguments in favor of consecutive sentencing. First, it 
improperly identified the whole neighborhood as victims of Moa's crime. Second, it 
speculated that Moa may have been involved in other, more serious offenses that involved 
serious physical injury. These arguments denied Moa his rignt to be sentenced based on a 
fair assessment of the gravity and circumstances of the offences, the number of victims, and 
I 
his history, character, and rehabilitative needs. The trial court did not reject the State's 
I 
arguments. Then, when it imposed consecutive sentencing, it made no reference to the 
many mitigating factors, but focused instead on its sense thai Moa was an extreme danger to 
the community. Accordingly, Moa asks this Court to remaqd for resentencing. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY AFFIRMING CASE 
NO. 3971 EVEN THOUGH THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MOA'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 
A guilty plea violates the Due Process Clause if it is not knowing and voluntary. See 
infra at Part LA. To ensure that pleas are knowing and voluntary, this Court has said that 
trial courts must strictly comply with rule 11. See infra at Part LB. A guilty plea violates 
rule 11 and is not knowing and voluntary if the trial court accepts it without a showing that 
the defendant understood the nature and elements of the offense or the factual basis for the 
plea. See infra at Part I.C. In this case, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the 
trial court erred when it denied Moa's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See infra at Part 
I.D. The court of appeals also correctly concluded that the trial court's error was obvious, 
as required by the plain error doctrine. See infra at Part I.E.l. This Court should reverse, 
however, because the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the trial court's error did 
not warrant reversal because it was not harmful. See infra at Part I.E.2. 
A. To Satisfy Due Process, a Guilty Plea Must Be Knowing and Voluntary. 
"A 'guilty plea is not valid under the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution unless it is knowing and voluntary.'" Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, ^ [20, 203 
P.3d 976 (quoting Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, [^17, 173 P.3d 842) (citation omitted); see 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2008) ("A plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon 
leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."). 
"A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various 
acts." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (citation omitted). "[I]t is itself a 
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conviction." 1± (citation omitted); see Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2(2)-(3) (2008). Once a 
I 
guilty plea is entered, "nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment." 
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (citation omitted). In other words, "[w]hkt is at stake for an 
accused" who enters a guilty plea is the same as for an accused who is convicted at trial: He 
faces criminal punishment, which may include "death or imprisonment." Id. at 243-44. 
Thus, due process "demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing 
the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea 
connotes and of its consequence." Id. 
Failure to uphold the rigorous demands of due process when accepting guilty pleas 
could undermine trust in the criminal justice system. The overwhelming "'majority of 
criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty.'" Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n.7 
(citation omitted). In fact, "[p]leas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions." 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 450 (31st ed. 2005) (Table 5.46) 
(only approximately 5% of all state felony criminal prosecutions go to trial) (other citation 
omitted)); see Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Judicial Reporting 
Program: Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006—Statistical Tables, Dec. 2009, Sec. 4 
("Most (94%) felony offenders sentenced in 2006 pleaded guilty (table 4.1)."). 
Therefore, if the system that generates nearly 95% of convictions is to maintain the 
support of the public, it must ensure the guilty pleas it accept^ are knowing and voluntary. 
See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (19(71) ("Properly administered, 
[plea bargaining] is to be encouraged" because it benefits society, but the societal benefits of 
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plea bargaining "presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a 
prosecutor," meaning the defendant's constitutional rights, including the right to understand 
the "factual basis for the plea," must be protected). 
B. Strict Compliance With Rule 11 Satisfies Due Process and Section 77-13-6(2)(a) 
Because It Ensures Guilty Pleas Are Entered Knowingly and Voluntarily. 
Rule 11 embodies the knowing and voluntary standard employed by due process and 
Utah Code section 77-13-6. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 Adv. Committee Note (stating rule 11 is 
"intended to reflect current law without any substantive changes"). It "is designed to protect 
an individual's rights when entering a guilty plea 'by ensuring that the defendant receives 
full notice of the charges, the elements, how the defendant's conduct amounts to a crime, the 
consequences of the plea, etc.'" Bluemel, 2007 UT 90 at ^17; see State v. Beckstead, 2006 
UT 42, TflO, 140 P.3d 1288 ("Rule 1 1 . . . requires that guilty pleas be accepted only from 
defendants who understand the rights they surrender by pleading guilty and who voluntarily 
waive those known rights."); State v. Corwell 2005 UT 28, ^11, 114 P.3d 569 ("<[T]he 
substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby 
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty.'" (citation omitted)). 
Rule 11 protects an individual's rights by listing "the detailed inventory of rights that 
a defendant will waive if his guilty plea is accepted." Beckstead, 2006 UT 42 at *fl0. These 
rights represent the "full complement of information" that a trial court "must communicate 
to a defendant" before accepting his guilty plea. Id.; see Bluemel, 2007 UT 90 at <| 17 
(holding rule 11 "identifies specific rights that a trial court must explain to a defendant"). 
Utah courts "have placed the burden of complying with rule 11 (e) on the district 
courts, requiring them to 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly 
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knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his 
or her constitutional rights."5 Corwell 2005 UT 28 at [^11 (citation omitted); see State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). Utah courts "have described this burden 'as a 
duty of "strict" compliance.'" Corwell 2005 UT 28 at %l1 (citation omitted). 
"[Sjtrict compliance with rule 11(e) does not require that a district court follow a 
'particular script.5" Id at f 12 (citation omitted). "To the contrary, 'strict compliance can be 
accomplished by multiple means so long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so 
long as the record reflects the requirement has been fulfilled.5" Id. (citation omitted). In 
other words, "the test of whether a district court strictly complies with rule 11(e) is not 
whether the court recites the phrases found in that rule. Rather, jhe test is whether the 
record adequately supports the [trial] court's conclusion that the (defendant had a conceptual 
understanding of each of the elements of rule 11(e).55 Id. at f 18J "Because strict compliance 
may be accomplished through a variety of means, the question 6f whether a defendant was 
provided with a sufficient understanding of rule 11(e) rights 'necessarily turn[s] on the facts 
of each case.555 Id. at *| 12 (citation omitted). 
C A Guilty Plea Is Not Knowing and Voluntary If It Wfas Accepted Without a 
Showing that the Defendant Understood the Nature and Elements of the Offense 
and Factual Basis for the Plea. 
Rule 11 says, in part, that a court "may not accept55 a gijdlty plea until it has found: 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; . . . 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature afnd elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; [anq] 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2), (4). 
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If the right to understand the nature and elements of the offense and the right to 
understand the factual basis for the plea are not satisfied, then the plea is not knowing and 
voluntary and is, therefore, invalid under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. 
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (plea not knowing and voluntary if "defendant pleads 
guilty to a crime without having been informed of the crime's elements5' (citation omitted)); 
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) ("[CJlearly the plea could not be voluntary 
. . . unless the defendant received 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, 
the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.5" (citations omitted)); 
Boy kin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5 ('"[Bjecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of 
a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.'") (citation omitted)); McCarthy v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (A guilty plea "is an admission of all the elements of a 
formal criminal charge" and cannot be voluntary unless defendant understands "the law in 
relation to the facts."); id. at 470 ("There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the 
record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature of the 
charge against him."); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986) (trial 
court must "make the minor investment of time and effort necessary to set forth the meaning 
of the charges and to demonstrate on the record that the defendant understands"), cert, 
denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986); Nicholls, 2009 UT 12 at [^20 ("A knowing and voluntary plea 
is one that has a factual basis for the plea."); In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, ^ [22, 173 P.3d 1279 
(due process "requires that the defendant 'possess [] an understanding of the law in relation 
to the facts' for a plea to be knowing and voluntary."); id at [^25 ("Without an adequate 
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communication of the nature and elements of the offense that is the subject of the admission, 
the admission is presumptively not knowing and voluntary."); Staje v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 
371, 373 (Utah 1996) (to ensure plea is "'truly voluntary,'" judge must "determine that the 
defendant 'possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts"' and must confirm 
"that the defendant understands the elements of the crime" (citation omitted)); Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1312 ("[T]o make a knowing guilty plea, the defendant must understand the 
elements of the crimes charged."); id at 1313 (factual basis "must be explained in the taking 
of a guilty plea so that the defendant understands and admits those elements"). 
Thus, in cases where the trial court failed to inform the defendant of the nature and 
elements of the offense or failed to establish a factual basis for tnose elements, the Court has 
routinely reversed. Compare Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372-75 (reversing guilty plea to 
aggravated murder by means of a bomb because defendant "admitted only that he 'knew the 
bomb could cause death' and that 'by concealing it [he] had created a great risk of death,'" 
not that he '"intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death of another'"); and Willett v. 
Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992) (reversing because "plia colloquy failed to develop 
the factual basis necessary for the court to properly accept [defendant's] plea"); with 
Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 182-83 (holding defendant's "guilty plea would indeed be invalid if 
he had not been aware of the nature of the charges against him," but holding defendant was 
"properly informed before pleading guilty" since "his attorneys represented on the record 
that they had explained to their client the elements of the aggravated murder charge," and 
defendant "confirmed that this representation was true"); Staje v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1125 
(Utah 1991) (affirming plea under substantial compliance te$t where information "contained 
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a detailed probable cause statement describing" the elements, the factual basis, and 
defendant's confession; defendant "had a copy of the information and did not dispute its 
contents"; and "affidavit which [defendant] executed in open court stated facts showing that 
he understood the elements of the crime"); Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 
1989) (affirming conclusion that defendant understood elements and factual basis where 
defendant "attended the preliminary hearing at which the victim testified," "victim's factual 
statements made out all the elements of each crime," defendant waived reading of the 
information at the first arraignment because he had a copy and knew its contents, and the 
judge read the charges and the factual basis at the second arraignment despite defendant's 
assurance that he understood the charges); and State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 
(Utah 1988) (affirming plea where defendant was informed about elements and factual basis 
at arraignment and defendant's taped confession was included in plea hearing). 
D. In This Case, the Court of Appeals Correctly Concluded that the Trial Court 
Erred When It Denied Moa's Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea. 
The court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the holding in Salazar v. Warden, 852 
P.2d 988 (Utah 1993), even though limited to post-conviction challenges, has "equal 
application in a direct appeal of denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea." 
Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at ^13 n.2. In Salazar, the Court held "noncompliance with [rule 
11] is not necessarily a constitutional violation." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991. Thus, when 
seeking post-conviction relief, "a petitioner must show more than a violation of the 
prophylactic provisions of rule 11; he or she must show that the guilty plea was in fact not 
knowing and voluntary." Id. at 992. Contrary to the court of appeals' decision, however, 
this Court expressly limited Salazar to writs of habeas corpus. In Salazar and again in 
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Bluemel this Court "stress[edj" that it was "not retreating from [itjs] holding in [] Gibbons." 
Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991 n.6; see Bluemel 2007 UT 90 at ffi[18-19|. On "direct appeal from 
a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea," "failure to strictly I comply with" rule 11 is 
"grounds for reversal." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991 n.6; see Bluemel 2007 UT 90 at ffi[18-19. 
Despite its unduly restrictive analysis, the court of appealsl correctly concluded that 
the trial court erred when it denied Moa's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Moa, 
2009 UT App 231 at Tf 15. The court of appeals held: 
The full elements of the third-degree felony to which Mod was pleading were 
not referenced or clarified anywhere in the colloquy or plea statement. 
Furthermore, the elements and factual basis in the plea affidavit and the 
colloquy were those of a class B misdemeanor, not a felony. Moa's statement 
that his counsel had told him about the elements of the crime does not obviate 
this error because there is no evidence that these discussipns included the 
intent to intimidate or harass another. 
Id. This holding was correct because the trial court accepted Mba's guilty plea without first 
informing him about a necessary element of the offense, see infra at Part LD.l, and without 
ensuring there was a factual basis for the plea. See infra at Pari I.D.2. 
1. The Trial Court Failed to Inform Moa of a Necessary Element of the Offense 
Before Accepting His Guilty Plea. 
Moa pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). In relevant part, section 76-10-508 says: 
(l)(a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle; [or] 
(vii) without written permission to discharge the dangerous weapon from the 
owner or person in charge of the property within 600 feet of: 
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; . . . 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor 
unless the actor discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances 
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not amounting to criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which 
case it is a third degree felony and the convicted person shall be sentenced to 
an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison: 
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to 
damage a habitable structure . . . , discharges a firearm in the direction of any 
building;. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a), (2)(b). 
The requirement that the defendant act "with intent to intimidate or harass another or 
with intent to damage a habitable structure" is a necessary element of discharging a firearm 
toward a building, a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). It is the mens 
rea element of the offense. See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 n. 18 ("[Ijntent is such a critical 
element of the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is required."); 
Hicks v. Franklin, 546 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008) ("depraved mind element, which is 
the requisite mens rea under [the] second degree murder statute, is a critical element of the 
offense" (citations omitted)); Allen v. Mullin, 368 F.3d 1220, 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (same). 
It is also the element that elevates the offense from a class B misdemeanor to a third 
degree felony with an enhanced penalty. See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 n.18; United 
States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2002) ("when drug quantity exposes the 
defendant to a higher statutory maximum sentence," it is "a critical element" of which the 
defendant must be adequately informed); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1142-43 (8th Cir. 
1999) (reversing defendant's plea of guilty to felony-murder where trial court told defendant 
intent to kill was not necessary, but failed to add that intent to commit underlying felony 
was necessary); Nash v. Israel, 707 F.2d 298, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming habeas 
corpus relief where judge failed to inform defendant about intent element of murder after 
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defendant "stated that he did not understand the charge55); Harned V. Henderson, 588 F.2d 
12, 22-24 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming habeas corpus relief where defendant was not informed 
about "'physical injury5 element of the charge55 before "accepting the plea55). 
Our Legislature has determined that the seriousness of discharging a firearm toward a 
building depends on the defendant's intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)-(2). A person 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, (2) 
discharges a "dangerous weapon or firearm,55 (3) "within 600 feet of.. . a house, dwelling, 
or any other building.55 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(1 )(a)(vii), (2); see id at § 76-2-102 
(2003) (providing that if a statute "does not specify a culpable mental state,55 then "intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility55). Whereas, a 
person is guilty of a far more serious crime that amounts to a third degree felony and 
warrants "an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison,55 if he (1) "discharges a 
firearm in the direction of any building,55 (2) "with intent to intimidate or harass another or 
with intent to damage a habitable structure.55 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). 
Nothing in the record, however, indicates that the trial court informed Moa that a 
necessary element of discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony, was that 
I 
he acted "with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable 
structure.55 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). During the p i p colloquy, the nature and 
elements of the offense were explained by defense counsel: "[Ajpparently on or about the 
4th of April 2003 Mr. Moa, as a party, intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm 
toward a building in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.55 R. 3971 (226:6). Supplementing 
defense counsel's statement, the affidavit explained the elements of the offense like this: 
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"On or about 4/4/2003 defendant as a party intentionally and knowingly discharged a 
firearm from a vehicle toward [building]" in "SL County State of Utah." R. 3971 (76). 
Beyond the plea colloquy and the affidavit, the record shows no other information 
available to Moa at the time he pleaded guilty that provided a different or more 
comprehensive list of elements. See McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470 ("There is no adequate 
substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge against him."). In particular, the original 
information charged Moa with an entirely different crime—aggravated assault—and gave 
Moa no warning that he was admitting that he acted "with intent to intimidate or harass 
another or with intent to damage a habitable structure." See R. 3971 (1-3). And the 
amended information (which listed "intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to 
damage a habitable structure" as an element of the offense) was not filed until two and one-
half weeks after the change of plea hearing. R. 3971 (98-100; 226:4-6). 
In sum, the trial court failed to determine whether Moa understood that "intent to 
intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure" was a necessary 
element of the offense. Without this element, the nature and elements of the offense 
described to Moa amounted only to a class B misdemeanor. Thus, the trial court failed to 
strictly comply with rule 11. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). It also failed to satisfy due 
process and section 77-13-6. See supra at Part I.C. 
2. The Trial Court Failed to Determine that Moa Possessed an Understanding of the 
Law in Relation to the Facts Before Accepting His Guilty Plea. 
At the change of plea hearing, Moa was willing and able to "admit culpability." Utah 
R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). Thus, rule 11 required the factual basis to "establish[] that the 
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charged crime was actually committed by the defendant." Id. The) trial court, however, 
accepted a factual basis sufficient to prove a class B misdemeanor but not to prove 
discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony. See supra at Part I.D.I. 
At the plea hearing, defense counsel offered the "factual predicate . . . for the plea." 
R. 3971 (226:6). "[Apparently on or about the 4th of April 2003 M Mr. Moa, as a party, 
intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm toward a building in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah." R. 3971 (226:6). This factual basis was supplemented by the plea affidavit, 
which said: "Defendant on the date and time was a party to the discharge of firearm within 
600 feet of [building] w/out person towards the direction of people." R. 3971 (76). 
The factual basis provided in the plea affidavit is difficult! to decipher. See R. 3971 
(76); supra at n.4; Addendum H. Further, once deciphered, it sekns, at best, confused about 
the crime that Moa pleaded guilty to and the facts that Moa admitted. See R. 3971 (76). In 
particular, "within 600 feet of [building] w/out person" comes from the class B 
misdemeanor. Compare R. 3971 (76); with Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a)(vii)(A). 
There is no similar language in the third degree felony statute. See id. at § 76-10-508(2). 
Likewise, "towards the direction of people" appears to reference the aggravated 
assault allegations in the information. Compare R. 3971 (1-3); with R. 3971 (76). It may 
also reference the offense of discharging a firearm in the direction of a person. Compare R. 
3971 (1-3); with Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(a). But, aftet assessing the strength of its 
case, the State chose not to proceed on charges related to people. See R. 3971 (98-100). 
Indeed, there are several references in the record to the fact that the State had difficulty 
getting their potential witnesses to appear in court. See R. 3971 (234:5, 7-8, 15). 
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Besides, even if the State had proceeded on charges related to people, the trial court 
failed to establish, as required by rule 11, section 77-13-6, and due process, that Moa 
understood the elements or factual bases for those offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
102 (2003) (listing elements of assault that include use of "unlawful force or violence" 
coupled with attempt or threat "to do bodily injury to another," or act "that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another"); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (2003) (listing elements for aggravated assault, including that defendant 
"intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another," or "uses a dangerous weapon . . . or 
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury"); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-508(2)(a) (listing as element of discharging a firearm in the direction of a person that 
defendant act "knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be endangered"). 
In sum, as related to the discharging a firearm toward a building charge, the facts that 
Moa admitted are: (1) "on or about the 4th of April 2003," (2) he "intentionally and 
knowingly," (3) "discharged a firearm," (4) "toward a building" or "within 600 feet of 
[building] w/out person" (5) "in Salt Lake County, State of Utah." R. 3971 (76; 226:6). 
These facts, however, do not include any admission of the essential element that Moa acted 
"with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b); see supra at Part I.D. 1. In other words, the trial court 
failed to elicit a factual basis to establish that Moa actually committed the offense of 
discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony. Instead, it elicited a factual 
basis to establish that Moa committed the offense of discharging a firearm, a class B 
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misdemeanor. Accordingly, the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11. See Utah 
R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). It also failed to satisfy due process and section 77-13-6. 
E. The Court of Appeals Erred When It Determined that the Error, Although 
Obvious, Did Not Require Reversal Because It Was Not Prejudicial, As 
Required By the Plain Error Doctrine. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court nliay not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citatiod omitted). "The 
preservation rule serves two important policies." Id. "First, 'in the interest of orderly 
procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if 
appropriate, correct it.'55 Id (quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989)). 
"Second, a defendant should not be permitted to forego making ah objection with the 
strategy of'enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,. 
I 
. . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse.555 Id. (citation omitted). "To serve 
these policies, [the Court] ha[s] held that the preservation rule applies to every claim, 
including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional 
circumstances5 exist or 'plain error5 occurred.55 Id. (citations omitted). 
"The plain error exception enables the appellate court to balance the need for 
procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.555 Id. at [^13 (citation omitted). "'At 
bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [the Court] to avoid injustice.555 Id. 
(citation omitted). "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial Court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful. . . ,555 Id. (citation omitted). In this case, the court of appeals correctly held that the 
trial court erred when it denied Moa5s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See supra at Part 
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I.D. The court of appeals also correctly held that the error was obvious. See infra at Part 
I.E.l. But the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that obvious error did not require 
reversal because it was not harmful. See infra at Part I.E.2. 
L The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that the Trial Court's Error Was Obvious. 
"To establish that the error should have been obvious to the trial court," Moa "must 
show that the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." 
Dean, 2004 UT 63 at ^fl6 (citations omitted). In this case, the court of appeals concluded 
that "the error should have been obvious to both the court and counsel because the statute 
was unambiguous." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at 1J15. This decision was correct. 
The trial court is charged with knowing the law and applying it. See Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct 1.1, 2.2, 2.5 (2010) (stating judge shall apply the law and maintain 
professional competence). The need to ensure that Moa understood the nature and elements 
of the offense and to elicit a factual basis for the plea should have been obvious to the court. 
At the time of Moa's guilty plea, the Due Process Clause, section 77-13-6, rule 11, and 
federal and Utah case law all required the trial court "to 'personally establish that the 
defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the 
defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights.'" Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at \\1 
(citation omitted); see, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2008); Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e)(2), (4); Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 182; Nicholls, 2009 UT 12 at ^20; Bluemel, 2007 UT 
90 at 1(17; Visser, 2000 UT 88 at Tfl 1; Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372-73; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 
1312; supra at Parts I.A., LB. 
28 
In particular, the law required the trial court to ensure that the defendant understands 
"the nature and elements of the offense" and the factual basis for the plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e)(2), (4); see, e.g., Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 183; McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466-67, 470; 
Nicholls, 2009 UT 12 at «p0; K.M., 2007 UT 93 at ffi|22, 25; Thurfnan, 911 P.2d at 373; 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13. Indeed, the law recognized that uriderstanding the nature and 
elements of the offense is "'the first and most universally recognized requirement of due 
process/" Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 (citation omitted); and that! a plea "cannot be truly 
voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the 
facts." Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5 (citation omitted); see supra at Part I.C. 
In this case, "the statute was unambiguous." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at *fll5. The 
requirement that the defendant act "with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent 
to damage a habitable structure" was a necessary element of the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-508(2)(b); see supra at Part. I.D. That element, however, was "not referenced or 
clarified anywhere in the colloquy or plea statement. Furthermore, the elements and factual 
basis in the plea affidavit and the colloquy were those of a class B misdemeanor, not a 
felony." Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at [^15; see supra at Part I.D. Thus, it "should have been 
obvious to both the court and counsel" that it was error for the court to accept Moa's plea 
without first establishing that Moa understood the omitted element of the offense and that 
I 
there was a factual basis to support that element. See Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at ^|15.5 
If this Court disagrees with the argument that the error was olWious, but agrees that the 
error was harmful, then Moa asks this Court to remand to the court of appeals for 
consideration of his argument that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel. See Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at Yf3, 17 n.4 
(holding no plain error because Moa was not harmed by the tqal court's obvious error, and 
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2. The Court of Appeals Erred When It Held that the Trial Court's Obvious Error 
Was Not Harmful 
To satisfy the plain error test, a defendant must show that the "error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" Holgate, 
2000 UT 74 at fl3 (citation omitted). 
When applying the harmless error test to a guilty plea, "there is no way one can be 
sure that [the defendant] would have refused to enter the plea" if the trial court had properly 
informed him of his rule 11 rights. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 644 n.12; see State v. Mora, 
2003 UT App 117,1J22 n.4, 69 P.3d 838 (noting harmless error rule difficult to apply to rule 
11 violations because "issue of whether the defendant would have entered the plea but for 
the error would, in most cases, turn in part on the defendant's subjective assertions"). Thus, 
in the context of guilty pleas, "establishing harm . . . generally requires the defendant's 
assertion that 'but for' the alleged error, he or she would not have pled guilty." Dean, 2004 
UT 63 at |^22 (citation omitted); see id at ^23-24 (upholding plea under plain error doctrine 
where defendant did not assert harm, but asked Court to presume it because the right to a 
speedy, public trial, which defendant alleged was missing from the plea colloquy, "'is a 
substantial constitutional right'"); State v. Hittle, 2004 UT 46, <|[5, 94 P.3d 268. 
Additionally, establishing harm requires the defendant to show that the error affected 
his "substantial rights." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1992) (citing Eldredge, 
773 P.2d at 35); see, e.g.. State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, flO, 82 P.3d 1106 (plain error test 
declining to "address Moa's ineffective assistance of counsel argument because it also 
requires a showing of prejudice" (citation omitted)). 
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requires that "'error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a 
party"5 (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989)); $tate v. Kay, 717 P.2d 
1294, 1302 (Utah 1986) ("Rule 11 error will not invalidate the plea taken unless the error 
results in a substantial violation of a party's rights."). 
The substantial rights standard may be difficult for a defendant to meet when the 
error complained of is a technical rule 11 violation that does not implicate due process. See 
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85 (2004). In Dominguez Benitez, for 
I 
example, no plain error occurred because the error was merely a technical violation of rule 
11, rather than a due process violation, and "was inconsequential jto [defendant's] decision" 
I 
to plead guilty. Id, at 84. In that case, the trial court failed to inform defendant, as required 
i 
by the federal version of rule 11, that he "'has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does 
not follow the [sentencing] recommendation.'" IdL at 80 (citation omitted). On certiorari, 
the Court held that it was "hard to see here how the warning coujd have affected 
[defendant's] assessment of his strategic position" because "the £lea agreement... 
specifically warned" defendant "that he could not withdraw his plea if the court refused to 
accept the Government's recommendations," and defendant made clear before he learned 
about the recommendation "that he did not intend to go to trial.'[ Id at 84-85. 
In reaching its decision, the Court also noted that there was a strong factual basis for 
the plea, including "a controlled sale of drugs to an informant ajid a confession." Id 
Regarding the strength of the factual basis, the Court made clear that "[t]he point of the 
question is not to second-guess a defendant's actual decision; if it is reasonably probable he 
would have gone to trial absent the error, it is no matter that th^ choice may have been 
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foolish." Id. at 85. In that case, however, the Court concluded that the strong factual basis 
along with the specific warning in the plea agreement and defendant's expressed intent not 
to go to trial regardless of the sentencing reduction "tend[ed] to show that the Rule 11 error 
made no difference to the outcome." Id. at 85 (emphasis added); see State v. Martinez, 2001 
UT 12, ^ [18-19, 26 P.3d 203 (holding defendant not prejudiced by incorrect advice that he 
could move for a 402 reduction if he pleaded guilty because he "was informed of counsel's 
error" and given the opportunity to move to withdraw the plea, but he chose not to, and 
counsel "testified that he still would have advised defendant to plead guilty had he known of 
the change in the law" since the State's evidence against defendant was compelling). 
Whereas, the substantial rights standard is "clearly met" where due process is 
violated because the trial court omitted an essential element of the offense from the plea or 
failed to obtain a factual basis for the plea. Brown, 853 P.2d at 853-54; see, e.g., Boy kin, 
395 U.S. at 243 n. 5 (plea entered without showing that defendant understood elements of 
offense and factual basis for plea violates "'due process and is therefore void'" (citation 
omitted)); Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 182-83 ("Where a defendant pleads guilty to a crime 
without having been informed of the crime's elements, [the knowing and voluntary] 
standard is not met and the plea is invalid."); McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 (guilty plea cannot 
be voluntary unless defendant understands "the law in relation to the facts"); Minore, 292 
F.3d at 1118 -20 ("for purposes of plain error review, a defendant's substantial rights are 
affected by Rule 11 error when the defendant proves that the court's error was not minor or 
technical and that he did not understand the rights at issue when he entered his guilty plea"); 
United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996) ("A guilty plea that was not 
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knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered is invalid and may be withdrawn by the 
defendant; a conviction resting upon such a plea must be vacated.']); Burford v. State, 515 
P.2d 382, 383 (Alaska 1973) ("Denial of a constitutional right, in tjie normal case, would 
affect substantial rights and give rise to plain error.5'); K.M., 2007 UT 93 at ^25 ("Without 
an adequate communication of the nature and elements of the offense that is the subject of 
the admission, the admission is presumptively not knowing and voluntary."). 
For example, State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 19J83), was "a case with 
clear plain error and obvious constitutional ramifications." Brown, 853 P.2d at 853. In 
Breckenridge, the defendant pleaded guilty to arson after a fire he started to dispose of old 
parts spread to a building. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 441. Defendant's statements during 
the plea colloquy showed that he "misunderstood the legal elements of arson and believed 
for some reason that his action in setting fire to the parts to get ria of them was criminal in 
nature." Id. at 442. Although he moved to withdraw his plea ancf appealed the denial of his 
motion, it was not until the Court suggested the issue during oral argument that defendant 
finally argued "his right to due process was violated because his guilty plea was accepted by 
the court without his understanding the nature and elements of aijson and without a showing 
i 
that there was any factual basis upon which to base conviction of a crime." IdL at 443. 
Regardless of defendant's failure to raise the issue until prompted by the Court, the 
Court reversed under the plain error doctrine. Id. at 443-44; see Brown, 853 P.2d at 853. 
"The court has an undoubted duty to guard against the possibility that an accused who is 
innocent of the crime charged may be induced to plead guilty without sufficient 
understanding of the nature of the charge or the consequences of his plea.'" Breckenridge, 
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688 P.2d at 443 (citation omitted). "A guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is uniformed. 
c[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charged, it 
cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in 
relation to the facts.'5' Id at 444 (citation omitted). In this case, the trial court made no 
finding that defendant understood the nature and elements of the offense, and such a finding 
"could not have been correctly made based on the defendant's pre-trial statements to the 
prosecutor and to the court at the time the plea was entered." Id at 443. Thus, "even 
though the plea colloquy did include a recitation of the surrounding facts, as a matter of law 
those facts were insufficient to support the charge." Willett 842 P.2d at 861 (citing 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 442-44); see State v. Children 454 A.2d 1274, 1277-80 (Conn. 
1983) (accepting defendant's claim that plea was not knowing and voluntary even though 
raised "for the first time on appeal," because trial court failed to inform him that a critical 
element of larceny was that he threatened "physical injury to some person in the future"). 
In fact, as demonstrated in Breckenridge and reaffirmed in State v. Robison, 2006 UT 
65, 147 P.3d 448, the erroneous omission of an essential element from the plea colloquy or 
from the factual basis is such a serious error that this Court will address it even if it is not 
raised by either party. In State v. Robison 2005 UT App 9, 2005 WL 91251, the court of 
appeals held that "'substantially contemporaneous exchange'" was an essential element of 
passing a bad check, and that its absence from the plea colloquy required reversal even 
though the issue was not raised by either party. Robison, 2006 UT 65 at 1fl[8-9. This Court 
reversed, but not because the court of appeals believed that it should reverse if an essential 
element of the offense was missing from the plea colloquy. Rather, this Court reversed 
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because the court of appeals acted on "a notion of [its] own invention" without first testing 
the notion through supplemental briefing. Id at [^24. Further, this Court reversed because 
contemporaneous exchange was not actually an element of the offense. Id. at <|34. Thus, its 
rule 11." IdatTJ37. 
have done as this Court 
absence from the plea colloquy did not "mandate[] reversal under j 
Explaining, this Court said that the court of appeals should' 
did in Breckenridge. See id. at f24. After the Court recognized iri Breckenridge "that the 
l 
briefing overlooked a compelling argument that, if presented, woi|ld likely merit reversal of 
I 
[defendant's] conviction," it raised the issue during oral argument and "invited" 
supplemental briefing. IcL (citation omitted). In sum, as stated injRobison, the Court has 
the authority to reverse where reversal is warranted: "As a court 6f last resort, we have the 
authority to decide on whatever grounds we deem appropriate, regardless of preservation or 
presentation." Id. at j^25 n.5. And reversal is warranted where a defendant's plea was taken 
in violation of due process because he was not informed of an es$ential element of the 
offense or asked to admit a factual basis sufficient to satisfy that element. See id. at [^37; 
Brown, 853 P.2d at 853; Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443-44. 
In other words, harm is self-evident when the trial court violates '"the first and most 
universally recognized requirement of due process,'" Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 (citation 
omitted), by accepting a guilty plea without first ensuring that the defendant understood the 
nature and elements of the offense and the factual basis for the plea. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 
545 U.S. at 183; Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5; McCarthy, 394 UhS. at 466-67, 470; Minore, 
292 F.3d at 1118 -20; Guerra, 94 F.3d at 995; Nicholls, 2009 U]T 12 at ^20; K.M., 2007 UT 
35 
93 at 1fl[22, 25; Thurman, 911 P.2d at 373; Brown, 853 P.2d at 853; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 
1312-13; Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443-44. 
This result makes sense because it treats guilty pleas like what they are—criminal 
convictions. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242; Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2(2)-(3) (2008). When 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence after a trial, this Court has said "there is a certain 
point at which an evidentiary insufficiency is so obvious and fundamental that it would be 
plain error for the trial court not to discharge the defendant." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ 17. 
"An example" of clear plain error "is the case in which the State presents no evidence to 
support an essential element of a criminal charge." Id; cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000) ("[Constitutional protections of surpassing importance," including 
"the proscription of any deprivation of liberty without 'due process of law,'" "indisputably 
entitle a criminal defendant to ' a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of 
the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (citations omitted)); In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged."). Therefore, as it is plain error to deny a 
motion to dismiss for lack of evidence where there is "no evidence to support an essential 
element of a criminal charge," Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^|17, it is plain error to deny a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea where an essential element of the offense was entirely omitted 
from the plea hearing or where there is no factual basis in the record to support that element. 
The Supreme Court highlighted the equivalence of guilty plea convictions and trial 
convictions in Henderson when it accepted defendant's assertion on habeas that he would 
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not have pleaded guilty if he had known that intent to cause the de^th of the victim was an 
element of the offense. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 644-47. In that case, the factual basis to 
support the omitted element was so strong that the Court accepted f 'the wisdom of [defense 
counsel's] advice to plead guilty" and "assumed that [defendant] probably would have 
pleaded guilty anyway" had he been informed about the omitted ejement. Id. at 644 & n.12. 
"Nevertheless, such a plea cannot support a judgment of guilt unlqss it was voluntary in a 
constitutional sense." IdL at 644-45. "And clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the 
sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the 
defendant received 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and 
most universally recognized requirement of due process.'" Id. at ^44-45 (citation omitted). 
In other words, "[tjhere is nothing in th[e] record that c[ould] serve as a substitute for either 
a finding after trial, or a voluntary admission, that [defendant] had the requisite intent." Id, 
at 646. "[E]ven if such a design to effect death would almost inevitably have been inferred 
from evidence that [defendant] repeatedly stabbed [the victim], it is nevertheless also true 
that a jury would not have been required to draw that inference." I Id, at 645-46. Thus, the 
Court held defendant's "plea was involuntary and the judgment of conviction was entered 
i 
without due process of law" because it was "impossible to conclude that his plea to the 
unexplained charge of second-degree murder was voluntary." IdL at 646-47; see also Ivy, 
173 F.3d at 1141-43 (holding trial court erred by not informing Qefendant that offense 
required intent to commit underlying felony, and that the error resulted in "actual 
l 
prejudice," even though "it might be argued that such an intent is manifested by the fact of 
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pointing a handgun at another/5 because "intent is not to be presumed, and had the case gone 
to trial the State would have been put to its proof on this element of the offense"). 
In this case, the court of appeals erred by holding that Moa was not harmed by the 
trial court's failure to inform him of an essential element of the offense or to elicit a factual 
basis for the plea. Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at <Jfijl6-17. As explained above, Moa did not 
have to prove "that he would have refused to enter his plea if he had been informed 
correctly of the elements." Id. at f 17. Rather, he had to prove that his substantial rights 
were affected. See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 644-45 & n.12; Casey, 2003 UT 55 at 1J40; 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^[13; Brown, 853 P.2d at 853. Moa has met this requirement. 
The element omitted from the plea colloquy and from the factual basis in this case 
was a "critical element" of the offense. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 n.18. Acting "with 
intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure" was the 
mens rea element of the offense; it was also the element that elevated the offense from a 
class B misdemeanor to a third degree felony with "an enhanced minimum term of three 
years in prison." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a)(vii), (2)(b); see supra at Part I.D.l. No 
aspect of the plea colloquy, however, informed Moa about this element before he entered his 
guilty plea. See supra at Part I.D. 1. Rather, the trial court only informed him of the 
elements required to prove discharging a firearm, a class B misdemeanor. See id Further, 
the trial court accepted a factual basis that was confused at best, and only admitted facts 
sufficient to prove the class B misdemeanor. See supra at Part I.D.2. 
The harm suffered by Moa is self-evident: The trial court denied Moa the substantial 
due process right to enter his plea and accept criminal punishment knowingly and 
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voluntarily. See supra at Part LD. It denied Moa the ability to make an intelligent judgment 
as to whether he should accept the plea or go to trial. See supra at (Part LD. And it entered 
an unjust criminal conviction (and imposed imprisonment) based dn a record that lacked 
sufficient evidence or an adequate admission. See supra at Part I.ljs.2. 
Although such a showing is not necessary, the record show^ that there was a 
reasonable probability that Moa would have rejected the plea if he had been informed of all 
i 
the elements of the offense and asked to admit to a factual basis that supported the elements. 
The record shows that even without having to admit the more serious allegation that he 
acted "with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable 
structure," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b), Moa was already concerned about entering a 
guilty plea. R. 3971 (226). During the plea colloquy, he asked the trial court questions, 
including a question about whether he "could get a trial." R. 3971 (226:10). Then, within 
I 
three weeks, he filed two pro se motions to withdraw it. R. 39711(101; 103). 
In his two pro se motions, Moa said he felt "really confused" by the change of plea 
proceedings and he believed that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 3971 
(101; 103). In particular, he claimed that the plea bargain was harsher than the bargain he 
believed he was accepting. R. 3971 (101; 103). Although testinjony provided by Garcia 
clarified that Moa was informed of the change in the plea bargain, see R. 3971 (227:11-17), 
his confusion as to the severity of the offense and its accompanying punishment suggests 
that he believed the elements he admitted constituted a less severe offense than they actually 
i 
did and that if informed of the true elements of the offense, he would have better understood 
the magnitude of the offense and rethought his plea. R. 3971 (101; 103). 
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Thereafter, in case no. 4352, Moa entered a guilty plea to one count of discharging a 
firearm from a vehicle, a third degree felony. R. 4352 (73-74; 75-81; 121). At that change 
of plea hearing, the State explained that it was "being thorough on this" case because Moa 
moved to withdraw his guilty plea in case no. 3791. R. 4352 (121:10). Accordingly, it 
informed Moa that the offense required "intent to intimidate or harass another." R. 4352 
(121:10). When presented with this information and asked if his intent "was to intimidate 
somebody," Moa responded, "No," and explained, "It wasn't to intimidate. It was just 
discharge the firearm." R. 4352 (121:10-11). Although Moa made this statement in regard 
to another case, it is evidence that he did not understand that a third degree felony offense of 
discharging a firearm required an "intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to 
damage a habitable structure." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). 
Given the circumstances of Case No. 4352 (including evidence that the firearm was 
discharged from a car, toward a home, "early in the morning," while "people were asleep"), 
Moa weighed his options and elected to continue with the plea. R. 4352 (121:11). Thus, the 
plea he entered was knowing and voluntary and he did not move to withdraw it. See R. 
4352. Under the different circumstances of Case No. 3971 (where the evidence did not 
include a car, a home, a neighborhood, or sleeping people, R. 3971 (2-3); and where the 
State was having difficulty getting its potential witnesses to appear in court, see R. 3971 
(234:5, 7-8, 15)), there is a reasonable probability that but for the court's failure to inform 
him about the elements of the offense and the factual basis for the plea, Moa would have 
declined to plead guilty and insisted on going to trial. See Thurman, 911 P.2d at 375 (record 
"failfed] to demonstrate that [defendant] fully comprehended the nature and elements of the 
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offense" where defendant acknowledged "that aggravated murder by means of a bomb 
required an intentional or knowing killing," but said "that he did not intend to kill" victim 
and refused "to admit that he knew the bomb would cause death" (emphasis omitted)). 
As support for its decision that Moa was not harmed by the (trial court's error, the 
court of appeals noted that Moa "was particularly anxious that he did not have to be 
incarcerated," and agreed to the deal that changed "the underlying! sentence . . . from zero-
to-five years to three-to-five years" in order to secure his immediate release. Moa, 2009 UT 
App 231 at 1[16; see R. 3971 (227:13-14). In Breckenridge, this Court said "that a valid 
guilty plea require[s] a 'record of facts' showing either 'that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant, or that the defendant has for some o^her legitimate reason 
intelligently and voluntarily entered such a plea.'" Willett, 842 Pi2d at 862 (quoting 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 440). Moa's desire to be released fronj jail on the day of his plea, 
i 
however, was not one of the legitimate reasons to enter a plea suggested by Breckenridge. 
A defendant does not give up his due process right to know the elements and the factual 
basis for his plea simply because he "state[s] his desire to plead guilty" and is "informed of 
the consequences of his plea." McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 464. 
As explained in Willett, when Breckenridge spoke of facts showing "some other 
legitimate reason" to enter a plea, it "meant facts that would substantiate the prosecution of 
the charge at trial, not merely facts establishing the defendant's motivation for entering the 
plea." Willett, 842 P.2d at 862 (citing Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 440). "A court cannot be 
satisfied that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary unless the record establishes facts that 
would place the defendant at risk of conviction should the matter proceed to trial." IdL 
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Thus, in Willett this Court reversed the trial court's decision to uphold the plea "on a 
finding '[t]hat although he knew in his own mind that he was not guilty. . . , he wanted to 
save his son from any jeopardy to the death penalty,"5 because "the record reveal[ed] no 
facts that would support the prosecution of the charge or suggest that either [defendant] or 
[his son] faced a substantial risk of conviction at trial." Id. Whereas, in North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the plea was voluntary even though the defendant "maintained 
his innocence" and pleaded guilty in order to "avoid[] risking the death penalty," because 
"the trial court documented facts . . . that would have placed the defendant at a serious risk 
of conviction had he proceeded to trial," and the defendant "acknowledged the strength of 
the state's case against him." Willett, 842 P.2d at 862 (citing Alford, 400 U.S. at 27-29). 
In sum, this Court should reverse because the court of appeals erred by holding that 
Moa was not harmed when the trial court violated due process by accepting his guilty plea 
without informing him about a necessary element of the offense or eliciting a factual basis 
to satisfy that element. Upon reversal, this Court should enter a conviction for discharging a 
firearm, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a)(vii). 
If... an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is 
insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that 
there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense... 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (2003). Although the language of this statute does not deal 
explicitly with guilty pleas, the same concept applies because the elements and factual basis 
established for Moa's guilty plea were insufficient to prove the felony offense but sufficient 
to prove the class B misdemeanor. See id. If this Court chooses not to enter a conviction 
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for the class B misdemeanor, then it should remand with an order allowing Moa to withdraw 
his guilty plea. See, e.g., K.M., 2007 UT 93 at [^32 (holding juvenile should "be allowed to 
withdraw her admission" because "her admission was not knowing and voluntary"). 
IL THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY AFFIRMING CASE 
NO. 4352 BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) governed tl(ie trial court's decision to 
impose Moa's sentences consecutively. In relevant part, that statute says: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant hak been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate' in the order 
of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concuirently or 
consecutively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to rui}i 
concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the 
defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether the state offense^ are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(l)-(2). 
The trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for an ab i^se of discretion. State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "The trial c^urt abuses its discretion 
when it fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the 
limits prescribed by law." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at ^66 (citations omitted). Further, the Due 
Process Clause "require[s] that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant 
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." Stately. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 
118 (Utah 1985); see State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Uljah 1993). 
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"A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of his 
background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which underlie 
the criminal justice system.55 State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). 
Although sentencing judges have "discretion in determining what punishment fits both the 
crime and the offender/5 Utah courts seek "to shore up the soundness and reliability of the 
factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that sentencing discretion.55 
State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980). 
Thus, a trial court does not have discretion to violate the defendant's due process 
"right to be sentenced based on relevant and reliable information regarding his crime, his 
background, and the interests of society.55 State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^34, 31 
P.3d 615, affd, State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ^19, 79 P.3d 937 ("one purpose of the right 
to allocute . . . is to ensure that the judge is provided with reasonably reliable and relevant 
information regarding sentencing55); see State v. Sweat, 722 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1986) ("so 
long as basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural fairness are afforded, 
the trial court has broad discretion in considering 'any and all information that reasonably 
may bear on the proper sentence555 (citation omitted)); Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1248 
("fundamental fairness55 requires that sentence be based only upon "accurate information55); 
State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957) (court abuses its discretion if it bases 
sentence upon "wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential consideration55). 
Information that is relevant to sentencing includes information related to the 
defendant's rehabilitation, punishment, incapacitation, restitution, and deterrence. See State 
v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1997) ("'The traditional justifications for punishment 
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in the criminal law include retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, ^nd rehabilitation.'" 
(citation omitted)). In addition, information that is relevant to "determining whether state 
i 
offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively," includes "the gijavity and circumstances 
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, apd rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). 
In State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), for example, defendant was convicted of 
three counts of aggravated robbery, absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three years 
before being sentenced. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 932. On appeal, Ms Court held the trial 
court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences because: (1) defendant's 
the record show[ed] that crimes were "very serious crimes—all first degree felonies," but" 
[the trial court] may not have given adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances," 
including the fact defendant "did not inflict any physical injuries,') I' only used a "pellet gun,' 
and took a "relatively small" amount of money; (2) defendant's history consisted only of 
"minor traffic offenses and one misdemeanor theft conviction," and his act of absconding 
only provided "nominal support" since he was not charged with bail jumping; (3) although 
defendant's "offenses and flight from justice reflected] negatively on his character," he 
"voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility," "expressed k commitment and hope to 
improve himself," and, while in Minnesota, "obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was 
a productive individual"; and (4) concurrent sentencing "better serve[ed]" his "rehabilitative 
I 
needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five 
years if he has shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." |d. at 938. 
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Compared to Galli, Moa's offenses were relatively minor—all third degree felonies. 
See R. 4352 (2-7; 73-81; 121). In addition, many of the "mitigating circumstances" in Galli 
are present here. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. First, as in Galli, Moa's "case did not involve 
physical harm or death to the victims." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at [^67. Additionally, Moa's 
involvement in the offenses revealed an immature character amenable to rehabilitation, 
rather than a hardened criminal beyond salvage. For example, regarding the discharging a 
firearm from a vehicle charge, the record shows that Moa was not the person who actually 
discharged the firearm. R. 4352 (6; 121:6). The record also suggests that Moa went along 
with the criminal conduct not with an actual intent "to intimidate," but "just [to] discharge 
the firearm." R. 4352 (121:11). Regarding the other charges, Moa's "flight from justice 
reflected] negatively on his character." Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. It was dangerous and 
irresponsible and led to the aggravated assault charge when he struck a police vehicle during 
the subsequent chase, but it did not reveal a hardened criminal so much as an immature 
young man who was afraid of being caught. See R. 4352 (2-7; 76; 121:6). 
Second, as in Galli, Moa "voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility for the 
crimes he committed." Galli, 967 P.2d at 938; see Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at TJ67; R. 4352 (73-
74; 75-81; 121). By pleading guilty and not moving to withdraw the plea, Moa showed that 
he felt remorse for his actions and had developed an attitude amenable to rehabilitation. R. 
4352 (73-81; 121). He also saved the State and its witnesses from the expense and trouble 
of a jury trial and acknowledged the need for punishment. R. 4352 (73-81; 121). 
Third, as in Galli, Moa, as much as possible given that he did not abscond for three 
years before sentencing, has shown "an ability to rehabilitate himself and become a 
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productive member of society." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at [^67. Moa'sj statements in preparation 
for sentencing revealed that he had accepted responsibility for his offenses and wanted to 
repay society and change his life for the better. Moa readily admitted his involvement in the 
offenses. R. 4352 (PSR:4). He apologized "to the public, [his] faijnily and everyone that 
was effected [sic] by [his] actions." R. 4352 (86; PSR:4). He "expressed a commitment and 
hope to improve himself." Galll 967 P.2d at 938; see R. 4352 (8^; PSR:4). And he 
outlined his plan to "start living a positive healthy life" so that he jwould not hurt society 
again or revert to criminal behaviors. R. 4352 (86; PSR: 4); compare State v. Schweitzer, 
943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (affirming consecutive sentencing where defendant 
"failed to make an effort in his own rehabilitation," despite several opportunities). 
Moa, however, was denied his right to be sentenced based Ion a fair assessment of his 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs because the State madp two improper arguments 
in favor of consecutive sentencing. First, the State improperly argued that the trial court 
should impose consecutive sentencing because the "whole neighborhood" was a victim of 
the crime. R. 4352 (122:6). Section 76-3-401 orders that a "couft shall consider . . . the 
number of victims" when "determining whether the state offense^ are to run concurrently or 
consecutively." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (emphasis added). When imposing 
consecutive sentences, then, a trial court abuses its discretion if it does "not properly 
consider" the number of victims involved. State v. Helms, 2002 
When interpreting a statute, this Court will "'assume the 
UT 12,^16, 40 P.3d 626. 
egislature used each term 
advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." State y. Miller, 2008 UT 61, ^18, 
193 P.3d 92 (citation omitted). In its ordinary meaning, the word "victim" refers to an 
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individual person. See Random House, Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 2119 (2n ed. 
2001) (defining victim as "a person who suffers from a destructive or injurious action or 
agency"); Black's Law Dictionary, 1598 (8 ed. 2004) (defining victim as "[a] person 
harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong"). Following this ordinary meaning, our Legislature 
has defined "victim" as referring to an individual—"' Victim' means a person against whom 
a crime has allegedly been committed." Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-2(3) (2003). Thus, 
following the ordinary meaning of the term, the "number of victims" factor included in 
section 76-3-401(2) refers to the number of "person[s] against whom a crime has allegedly 
been committed." Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-2(3). It does not refer to society as a whole. Id 
Accordingly, it was improper for the State to argue that consecutive sentencing was 
warranted because the "whole neighborhood" was a victim of the crime. R. 4352 (122:6). 
Second, the State improperly urged the trial court to impose consecutive sentencing 
because of other incidents that were not relevant or reliable. The prosecutor argued: 
[T]here was a murder in front of that home in February. One of the bullets 
went into the [] home and hit a young girl in the head. . . . It didn't kill her, 
luckily. 
Mr. Moa gets released from custody. Within two days, there's a 
shooting again at this home. 
Neighbors come out, there's some witnesses, not enough to put 
together a case but police are looking for Mr. Moa. 
R. 4352 (122:5). This information does not represent "relevant and reliable information 
regarding" the gravity and circumstances of Moa's "crime" or Moa's "background." 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at *f34. The shootings described were much more severe than 
the single shooting that Moa was charged with. They involved repetitive targeting of the 
same household and the near death of a "young girl." R. 4352 (122:5). But there is no 
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indication in the record that Moa was charged with or convicted of] the incidents described. 
See R. 4352. In fact, beyond the State's statement that Moa was "ifeleased from custody" at 
the time of one of these prior incidents, there is no indication in th$ record that Moa was 
even linked to these crimes. R. 4352 (122:5). Because there was iko reliable evidence 
linking these incidents to Moa, they constituted irrelevant and unreliable information that 
should not have been admitted at the sentencing hearing. See Johhson, 856 P.2d at 1071-72 
(holding court erred by considering "double and triple hearsay 
information and questionable factual assumptions" (citing United [States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 
based on incomplete 
1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding "factual matters may be considered as a basis for 
sentence only if they have some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.")). 
In sum, the State's comments improperly augmented the number of victims and 
referenced information that was not reasonably relevant or reliable. See Howell 707 P.2d at 
118. The court of appeals apparently agreed with Moa that the CQurt abused its discretion if 
it considered the State's argument when it imposed Moa's sentence. Moa, 2009 UT App 
231 at TJ20. Regardless, it affirmed because the record does not show "that the trial court 
actually relied on either of the prosecutor's statements." Id at ^ 0 . It is true that the record 
I 
does not indicate how heavily the trial court relied on the State's comments. R. 4352 
(122:6-7). But this is because "'Utah law does not require sentencing judges to enter 
specific findings on the record when imposing consecutive sentences.'" Helms, 2002 UT 12 
at ^fl7. Instead, if information is provided to the court during the sentencing hearing or in 
the PSR, then this Court will hold that is sufficient to "evidencen that the trial court did 
consider" that information. Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ^13; see, e.gl Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at J^68 
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("While the trial court did not specifically address the enumerated factors in Utah Code 
section 76-3-401(4), the transcript of the sentencing hearing," including the judge's findings 
about "the heinous nature of the crimes," "indicate[d] that he adequately considered them"). 
In this case, the record shows that the State used improper arguments to convince the 
court that Moa was "extremely dangerous," and the trial court did not reject the arguments 
as inappropriate for consideration. R. 4352 (122:5-7). The court then imposed consecutive 
sentences without acknowledging any of the mitigating factors because it accepted the 
State's argument that Moa was "can extreme danger to any community that he happens to be 
in.'" Moa, 2009 UT App 231 at ^20. This, Moa believes, is sufficient to show that the 
court did not properly consider the factors in section 76-3-401(4) and that its sentence was 
colored by information that was not reasonably reliable or relevant. See State v. Strunk, 846 
P.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Utah 1993) (reversing consecutive sentences even though defendant 
"was opined to be an extreme danger to the community" and "a long period of 
imprisonment was recommended" because court failed "to sufficiently consider defendant's 
rehabilitative needs"). Thus, Moa asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Moa asked this Court to reverse State v. Moa, 2009 UT App 231. 
SUBMITTED this \ \*aay of May, 2010. 
iHv y>C^fl>ft^L 
^ LORIJ.SEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner 
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Case No. 20080153-CA 
This matter is before the court upon Appellant 
consolidate the above cases. Appellee did not 
's motion to 
se the motion. oppo 
It appears that judicial economy will result by consolidating 
the appeals for a single determination. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the above appeals are consolidated as Case $To. 20070940-CA. 
All future filings shall be filed under Case No. 20070940-CA. 
Dated this r 
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day of May, 2 008. 
/-
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES MOA, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No; 031903971 FS 
Judge: TIMOfHY R. HANSON 
Date: October 29, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cheril 
Prosecutor: TORRIENTE, SEAN M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s); LJUNGBBRG, ROBIN K 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 3, 197 9 
Video 
Tape Number: DVR W37 Tape Count: 11;54 05 
CHARGES 
1, DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM VEH/HWY (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/25/2007 No Contest 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM 
VEH/HWY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term from 3 to 5 yeara in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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Case No: 031903971 
Date; Oct 29, 2007 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
148 Days credit time served is recommended. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $1000,00 
Suspended: $0,00 
Surcharge; $850.00 
Due: $1850.00 
Total Fine: $1000.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $850.00 
Total Principal Due: $1850 
PIUB Interest 
Fine payments are to be made to Board of Pardons Court, 
Dated this p9 day of (_ ) r jdUsL. 20 p] . ClrhUjL 
TIMOTHY R. HM^ON 
D i s t r i c t Coudf JfyLdge 
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES MOA, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Cape No: 071904352 FS 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: January 11, 2 008 
PRESENT 
Clerk; mckaem 
Prosecutor: TORRIENTE, SEAN M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LJUNGBERG, ROBIN K 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 3, 1979 
Audio 
Tape Number: 1-08 Tape Count: 9:25 
CHARGES 
1. DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM VEH/HWY - 3rd Degree felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/13/2007 Guilty 
8. FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POL1C - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea; Guilty - Disposition: 11/13/2007 Guilty 
9. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/13/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM 
VEH/HWY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term from 3 to 5 years in the Utah State Prison, 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT 
COMMAND OF POLIC a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five yearsi in the Utah State 
Prison. 
BaBed on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
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D a t e : J an 1 1 , 2008 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff; The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CON CURRENT /CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts are consecutive to each other and consecutive to any other 
commitments that defendant is currently serving 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge; $472.97 
Due: $1000.00 
Charge # 8 
Charge # 9 
Total Fine; $1000.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $472.97 
Total Principal Due: $1000.00 
Plus Interest 
Attorney Fees Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEYS 
Restitution to be left open for 120 days 
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IAR-17-2008 TON 12:39 PM i DISTRICT COURT FAX NO, 2387404 P, 06 
Case No: 071904352 
Date: Jan 11, 2008 
Defendant present from USP 
Dated this J \ day of ( .Jti/v*' 
STBPHB: , 
By jnAiafrrin 
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This opinion is subject to revision befoire 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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OPINION (For O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
Case No. 20070940-CA 
F I L E D (August 27, 2009) 
L' ..?PjU- UT App~23~l| 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 0319039f71 
The Honorable John Paul Kennedy-
Attorneys : Lori J. Seppi, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Ryan D. Tenjney, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Orme, and Davis. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
\L This appeal encompasses two consolidated cases stemming from 
separate drive-by shootings. In case no. 031903971 (case #3971), 
Charles Moa was charged with three counts of (aggravated assault. 
Moa entered a no-contest plea to one count of discharging a 
firearm toward a building but subsequently moved to withdraw his 
plea. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Moa to a 
prison term of three to five years. Moa appeals the trial 
court's denial of his motion, alleging violations of both rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Constitutional 
requirements, and essentially arguing that his plea was not 
entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was not informed of 
the nature and elements of the crime to which he pled. 
^2 In case no. 071904352 (case #4352), Moa was charged with 
seven counts of discharging a firearm toward a building, one 
count of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, one 
count of aggravated assault, and one count of failure to stop. 
Moa pleaded guilty to one count of discharging a firearm from a 
vehicle, failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, and 
aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Moa to three to 
five years on the discharge of a firearm charge, zero to five 
years on the failure to respond to an officer's signal charge, 
and zero to five years on the aggravated assault charge. All of 
the sentences from this case and case #3 971 were to run 
consecutively. Moa appeals the trial court's imposition of 
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences. We affirm in 
both cases. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[^3 Moa raises two issues, one pertaining to each case. First, 
he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in case 
#3971 by denying his motion to withdraw his no-contest plea. "We 
review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Holland, 
921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, " [w] hether the trial court strictly complied with rule 
11 is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.... The 
trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear 
error." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, % 9, 22 P.3d 1242 (citation 
omitted) . Moa concedes that this issue was not preserved and 
asks us to consider it under either the plain error doctrine or 
the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. Under the plain 
error doctrine, we reverse where the defendant "establish[es] 
that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, K 15, 95 
P.3d 276 (internal quotation marks omitted). Alternatively, we 
review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a matter of 
law. See State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) . 
In order for a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
challenge to succeed, the defendant "must 
show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable." 
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 
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1[4 Second, Moa argues that the trial court Abused its 
discretion in case #4352 by imposing consecutive rather than 
concurrent sentences. "We afford the trial cburt wide latitude 
in sentencing and, generally, will reverse a trial court's 
sentencing decision only if it is an abuse of the judge's 
discretion." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 66, 52 P.3d 1210 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Withdrawal of No-Contest Jplea 
15 We first consider whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Moa's motion to withdrajv his no-contest 
plea in case #3971. 
H6 On April 4, 2003, Moa and two other individuals allegedly 
discharged firearms toward three people in a business parking 
lot. Moa was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, a 
second degree felony. Moa was appointed an attorney, who 
withdrew because of a conflict and new counsel was appointed. On 
the day of his preliminary hearing, Moa Alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel and moved to have yet another attorney 
appointed. The trial court granted the rtiotioln, continued the 
hearing, and appointed James Valdez. We§ks llater, Valdez also 
requested permission to withdraw on the basis of a conflict and 
moved to continue the preliminary hearing. The trial court 
granted this motion and appointed Manny Garcia. While 
represented by Garcia, Moa entered a no-£onte]st guilty plea to 
one count of discharging a firearm towarca a building, a third 
degree felony, 
117 At the plea hearing, the State clarified the written plea 
agreement, stating that it would dismiss the three aggravated 
assault charges, that Moa would be released that day, and that it 
would recommend probation unless Moa failed to obtain a 
presentence report or committed any further crimes prior to 
sentencing. The trial court made a few h^ancjjes to the 
information by interlineation and the St&te agreed to submit an 
amended informati on reflecting the new cliarg^, which it did two 
and a half weeks later, 
1|8 During the plea colloquy, the attorneys, trial court, and 
Moa discussed Moa's charges. When asked for the factual 
predicate for the charge, defense counsel stated "Judge, 
apparently on or about the 4th of April 2003~Mr. Moa, as a party, 
intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm toward a 
building in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. That's what is 
written, down here as the element and the facts, Your Honor." 
Although neither counsel readily recalled the code section under 
20070 940-CA 3 
which Moa was being charged, the plea affidavit states: "76-10-
508 On or about 4/4/2003 defendant as a party intentionally and 
knowingly discharged a firearm from a vehicle toward [building] 
in [Salt Lake] County State of Utah." (strikeout in original). 
[^9 The trial court repeatedly asked Moa if he understood the 
charges and the procedure. Moa indicated that he did. Also, 
defense counsel Garcia explained that prior counsel Valdez "had 
already arranged this and I just reiterated it all and have gone 
over it again with [Moa] and I believe that this is our 
understanding of the deal." Moa agreed. 
flO At the time Moa allegedly committed the crime, Utah Code 
section 76-10-508 provided that it was a class B misdemeanor for 
a person to "discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm 
. . . within 600 feet of . . . a house, dwelling, or any other 
building." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(1) (a) (vii) (A), (2) (2003) 
(amended 2008). Section 76-10-508 further provided that it was a 
third degree felony with a minimum sentence of three years if the 
actor discharged the firearm "with intent to intimidate or harass 
another." Id. § 76-10-508 (2) (b) (emphasis added) ,x The trial 
court mistakenly informed Moa that a third degree felony was 
punishable by zero to five years in the state prison, but the 
attorneys corrected the court, and the court then correctly told 
Moa that the offense was punishable by three to five years. 
Neither the colloquy nor the plea affidavit referred to a 
specific subsection of 76-10-508, Likewise, they did not include 
subsection (2)(b)'s language, "with intent to intimidate or 
harass another." The trial court also told Moa that if he were 
convicted of the three original second-degree felony charges of 
aggravated assault, and the sentences were ordered to run 
consecutively, he "could be looking at 45 years." The trial 
court accepted Moa's no-contest plea, ordered a pre-sentence 
investigation (PSI) report, and ordered Moa released to Pretrial 
Services. 
|^ll On May 31, 2007, the State moved to revoke Moa's pretrial 
release because Moa did not report to Pretrial Services. On June 
9, 2007, the events leading to case #4352 occurred. 
[^12 On June 15 and 22, 2007, Moa filed pro se motions to 
withdraw his no-contest plea based on different issues than those 
now raised on appeal. Subsequently, Garcia moved to withdraw and 
was replaced with Moa's fifth attorney, Robin Ljungberg. At the 
1. Section 76-10-508 was amended in 2008. The quoted language 
is now found in Utah Code section 76-10-508.1, which outlines the 
penalties for a felony discharge of a firearm. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-508.1 (2008). 
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hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Moa stipulated 
there was full compliance with the provisions! of rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. At that hearing, Garcia 
testified that Valdez had prepared the plea affidavit and 
described why the changes were made. The trikl court denied 
Moa's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court's 
written Findings of Fact included: 
1. The parties stipulated that the plea 
taken on May 25, 2007 was taken in Compliance 
with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
3. The court finds Mr. Garcia to be a 
credible witness. 
4. The court finds that based on Mr. Moa's 
physical demeanor and his responsiveness to 
questions, Mr. Moa was aware of what was 
happening during the proceedings. 
5. The [c]ourt finds that all involved 
parties took measures to ensure that Mr*. Moa 
understood what was occurring, especially in 
light of the numerous changes in attorneys 
that Mr. Moa had on this case. 
The trial court concluded that "[t]he defendant's plea was 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made." 
[^13 Moa now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his no-contest plea, asserting that the trial court 
violated rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by 
failing to ensure that Moa understood all the elements of the 
crime, specifically the penalty-enhancing element of "intent to 
intimidate or harass another." Rule 11 describes necessary 
findings a trial court must make prior to accepting a guilty 
plea. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11. Included in rule 11 are the 
requirements that the court find that (1) "the defendant 
understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered" and (2) "there is a factual jbasis for the plea." 
Id. R. 11(e) (4) (A) - (B) . However, strict compliance with rule 11 
is not constitutionally required. See Salazar v. Warden, 852 
P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993) (discussing strict compliance and 
concluding "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a 
guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a 
defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United States 
Constitution").2 "[T]he substantive goal of |rule 11 is to ensure 
_ _ i 
2. Although Salazar involved a post-conviction challenge, its 
holding appears to have equal application in a direct appeal of 
(continued...) 
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that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the 
basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty. That goal 
should not be overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ] 11, 22 P.3d 1242. "[A] 
[defendant] must show more than a violation of the prophylactic 
provisions of rule 11/ he or she must show that the guilty plea 
was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 
992/ see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
1(14 We thus review Moa's no-contest plea to determine whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Moa's 
plea was knowing and voluntary. In order for a plea to be "truly 
voluntary, " "the trial court must determine that the defendant 
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." 
State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "[A] court considering such a claim is 
not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information 
the [defendant] received from his or her attorneys before 
entering the plea." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992/ see also Visser, 
2000 UT 88, H 13 (concluding that the record reflected that rule 
11 requirements were fulfilled). Furthermore, because we 
consider Moa's appeal under the plain error standard, we must 
determine whether " (1) an error exists/ (2) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court/ and (3) the error is harmful." 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, U 15, 95 P.3d 276. 
[^15 We agree with Moa that an error occurred because of an 
internal inconsistency in both the colloquy and the plea 
affidavit. The full elements of the third-degree felony to which 
Moa was pleading were not referenced or clarified anywhere in the 
colloquy or plea statement. Furthermore, the elements and 
factual basis in the plea affidavit and the colloquy were those 
of a class B misdemeanor, not a felony. Moa's statement that his 
counsel had told him about the elements of the crime does not 
obviate this error because there is no evidence that these 
discussions included the intent to intimidate or harass another. 
Further, the error should have been obvious to both the court and 
counsel because the statute was unambiguous. 
1[16 The question of whether the error was harmful is more 
difficult. Under plain error analysis, if obvious and plain 
error is established, a defendant must demonstrate that the error 
was "of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of 
2. (. . - continued) 
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea. See 
In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, H 22-23, 173 P.3d 1279/ State v. 
Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, H 21 n.9. 
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a more favorable outcome for the defendant." Id._ |^ 22 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). To wit, a defendant must show "that 
'but for" the alleged error, he or she would not have pled 
guilty." Id. In reviewing Moa's motion to withdraw, we 
"consider the facts and circumstances in which the plea was 
taken." Id. fl 12; see also Visser, 2000 UT 86, ^ 13 (involving a 
mid-trial plea). While it is true that the elements of the crime 
were erroneously stated, both the plea colloquy and plea 
affidavit support the conclusion that Moa clearly knew his plea 
was to a felony and also knew the potential sentence was three to 
five years. Moa admitted to firing a gun at p. building 
intentionally and knowingly, though he never admitted to an 
intention to harass or intimidate. Further, Garcia had 
approached the prosecution and negotiated an agreement that the 
underlying sentence would be changed from zero-to-five years to 
three-to-five years, and Moa would agree to a PSZ before 
sentencing in exchange for the State's agreement that Moa could 
be released that day and that it would not file any "related 
charges ." Moa was particularly anxious that he did not have to 
be incarcerated and would be released immediately, Garcia 
discussed these changes with Moa and Moa agreed to them. 
1(17 We recognize that a defendant's understanding and knowledge 
of the elements of the crime to which he is pleading no contest 
is an important part of the process. Nevertheless, we conclude 
that Moa has not established that he would have refused to enter 
his plea if he had been informed correctly of the elements and 
thus has not shown that the error "actually affected the outcome 
of the plea process," Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 23 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) , which is the essence of his burden when 
proceeding on a theory of plain error.3 Therefore^ Moa is not 
entitled to relief under the plain error docqi r m e .4 
3. We recently released our opinion in State v. Alexander, 2009 
UT App 188, which also addresses the trial court's failure to 
apprise a defendant of the elements of his claim. See id. K 1. 
That case is distinguishable because Alexander's claim was not 
advanced under the plain error doctrine. Here, Moa must 
establish that the trial court's error was ncbt harmless. 
Alexander, on the other hand, simply had to demonstrate that the 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. See id. ^ 14. 
4. Given our disposition on this issue, we freed not address 
Moa's ineffective assistance of counsel argument because it also 
requires a showing of prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
TnmnQAn. rn 7 
II. Consecutive Rather Than Concurrent Sentences 
|^18 Next, Moa argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by ordering the sentences in case #4352 and case #3971 to run 
consecutively. In determining whether sentences should run 
consecutively or concurrently, "the court shall consider the 
gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2008) . We review the 
trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, which "results 
when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or 
if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 
803 P. 2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (footnotes and internal quotation 
marks omitted) . 
1[19 Moa argues that the trial court's decision to impose 
consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion. Specifically, 
Moa challenges two statements made by the prosecutor during the 
sentencing hearing, arguing that the trial court may have relied 
on those statements. First, Moa complains that the trial court 
improperly relied on the prosecutor's statement that the "whole 
neighborhood" was a victim of the offenses. Moa also complains 
that the prosecutor referenced earlier incidents for which Moa 
was not charged. Specifically, during the sentencing hearing, 
the prosecutor stated: 
[T] here was a murder in front of that home in 
February. One of the bullets went into the 
. . . home and hit a young girl in the 
head. . . . It didn't kill her, luckily. 
[Moa] gets released from custody. Within two 
days, there's a shooting again at this home. 
Neighbors come out, there's some witnesses, 
not enough to put together a case but police 
are looking for [Moa] . And then in a few 
more days, there's another shooting. 
Moa asserts that the trial court erred in considering these 
statements because it failed to limit its consideration to the 
actual number of victims and there is no indication in the record 
that he was charged with or convicted of the incidents described. 
[^20 Moa's argument fails because the record does not support his 
claim that the trial court actually relied on either of the 
prosecutor's statements. " [T]he burden is on [the defendant] to 
show that the trial court did not properly consider all the 
factors in section 76-3-401(4)." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 
|^ 16, 4 0 P. 3d 62 6. Moa has not shown that the trial court 
actually relied on these statements; indeed, the trial court said 
little about which statutory factors it was considering, and it 
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is not required to. See State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, ^ 8, 
194 P. 3d 195 (stating trial court need not state to what extent 
it considered each of the statutory factors at the sentencing 
hearing) . The trial court said only that it considered Moa "an 
extreme danger to any community that he happens to be in." Moa 
speculates that this statement is connected to the prosecutor's 
statements, but in fact, the record does not support this 
speculation. To the contrary, the record supports the trial 
court's assessment, and the trial court acted within its 
discretion by weighing each individual factor as it chose. See 
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) ("One factor in 
mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on 
the opposite [side of the] scale."). Again, Moa has not 
presented evidence that would indicate that the trial court 
abused its discretion in weighing the given factors. 
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering Moa's sentences to run, consecutively 
rather than concurrently. 
CONCLUSION 
^21 We conclude that Moa has not demonstrated any prejudicial 
plain error regarding the trial court's acceptance of Moa's no-
contest plea: Moa has demonstrated that there was error in the 
taking of his no-contest plea, and that the error was obvious, 
but he has failed to show that the error was harmful. Thus, Moa 
is not entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine. We 
also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in running Moa's sentences consecutively rathjer than 
concurrently. We affirm. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PILED 
- — 0 0 O 0 0 — -
 U T A H APPELUTE COURTS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. Case ho. 20090882-SC 
Charles Moa, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on October 26, 2009. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues. 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner 
failed to demonstrate plain error in the acceptance of his guilty 
plea as to district court case number 031903971. 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district 
court's imposition of consecutive sentencing! 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. 
For The Court: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on January 29, 2010, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the 
United States mail or placed in the Interdepartmental mail 
service, or hand delivered to the parties listed below: 
LORI J. SEPPI 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
RYAN D. TENNEY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL BX 0854 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
LISA COLLINS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: MARINA DAVIS & LYN MACLEOD 
4 50 S STATE ST BX 1860 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this January 29, 2010. 
Judicia 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20090882 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE Case No. 031903971 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20070940 
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U. S. Constitution Amendment XIV 
Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. 
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein thefy reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized b^ law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any ?lave; but all such 
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section VII 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations -1- Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and 
commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed arc to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; 
and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences arc 
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified 
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or 
concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except is provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes thp death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all cjf which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be serveq, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single 
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2007) 
76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in direction of 
any person, building, or vehicle—Penalties 
(l)(a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle; 
(ii) from, upon, or across any highway; 
(iii) at any road signs placed upon any highways of the state; 
(iv) at any communications equipment or property of public utilities including 
facilities, lines, poles, or devices of transmission or distribution; 
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including any sign or signal; 
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated camp or picnic sites, overlooks, 
golf courses, boat ramps, and developed beaches; or 
(vii) without written permission to discharge the dangerous weapon from the 
owner or person in charge of the property within 600 feet of: 
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; or 
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal is kept or fed, including a barn, 
poultry yard, corral, feeding pen, or stockyard. 
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this section that the person 
being accused had actual permission of the owner or person in qharge of the 
property at the time in question. 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdpmeanor unless the 
actor discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstahces not 
amounting to criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it 
is a third degree felony and the convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of three years in prison: 
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or persons, 
knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be endangered; 
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a 
habitable structure as defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), discharges a firearm in 
the direction of any building; or 
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a firearm in the 
direction of any vehicle. 
(3) The court shall: 
(a) notify the Driver License Division of the conviction for purposes of any 
revocation, denial, suspension, or disqualification of a driver license under Section 
53-3-220(1 )(a)fxi); and 
(b) specify in court at the time of sentencing the length of the revocation under 
Subsection 53-3-225(1 )(c). 
(4) This section does not apply to a person: 
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when that person is in lawful defense of 
self or others; or 
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in Sections 23-20-1.5 and 76-10-
523 and as otherwise provided by law. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-10-508; Laws 1990, c. 328, § 3; Laws 1992, c. 99, § 1; 
Laws 1995, c. 23, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1999, c. 295, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; 
Laws 2000, c. 214, § 6, eff. March 14, 2000; Laws 2005, c. 220, § 12, eff. July 1, 
2005. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2005, c. 220, inserted subsec. (3) and redesignated former subsec. (3) as (4). 
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UtahR. Crim.P. 11(2008) 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant sh|all be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or 
not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant 
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for 
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In 
cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the 
requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest i)r guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived; 
(c)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements o|f the offense to which 
the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of ail 
those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by tljie defendant or, if the 
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, th|at the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
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(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, 
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and 
if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, 
a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or 
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-
13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the 
court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is 
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. 
The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of 
the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise 
the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
(i)(l)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement 
being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
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(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the ji}dge, upon request of 
the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with 
the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant 
to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may 
enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the 
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of 
any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-
103. 
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. 
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is no|, by itself, sufficient 
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
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5 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
6 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
7 P R O C E E D I N G S 
8 MR. MEISTER: Judge, we do have a resolution in 
9 this case after all. 
10 THE COURT: Let's go on the record* We're here in 
11 the matter of State of Utah. vs. Charles Moa. Counsel do you 
12 want to state your appearance? 
13 MR. GARCIA: Manny Garcia for the defendant, Your 
14 Honor. 
15 MR. MEISTER: Vincent Meister for the State. 
16 THE COURT: You think you've been able to work out 
17 some sort of a resolution in this matter you say? 
18 MR. GARCIA: With the Court's approval, yes. 
19 THE COURT: Why don't you tell us what the 
20 resolution is? 
21 MR. MEISTER: The resolution is the defendant will 
22 plead guilty to Discharge of a Firearm, 3rd Degree Felony. 
23 As part of the resolution the agreement would be that he 
24 would be released today. The State is recommending probation 
25 in this case but what the defendant has to realize is should 
1 the Court release him today and Court order^ a presentence 
2 report, should he not go get his presentence report, should 
3 he have any violations of the criminal laws of this state or 
4 any other state between now and the time of the sentencing, 
5 the probationary recommendation for sentencing goes away and 
6 we would be recommending incarceration at trie Utah State 
7 Prison. 
8 MR. GARCIA: That's our understanding. 
9 Is that your understanding, Charles? 
10 MR. MOA: Yes. 
11 MR. GARCIA: Stand up and come over here. Thank 
12 you. 
13 THE COURT: So as I understand what you said is he 
14 will be pleading guilty to a 3rd Degree Felbny, Unlawful 
15 Discharge of a Firearm. 
16 MR. GARCIA: Toward a building, yes. 
17 THE COURT: Toward a building anti the other charges 
18 will be dismissed; is that correct? 
19 MR, MEISTER: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: And then Mr. Moa wil'l be released 
21 today. He will report to AP&P at a time indicated by the 
22 Court, probably within 12 hours after his release. 
23 MR. GARCIA: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: If he's released later this afternoon 
25 that might not be until Monday or Tuesday because I think 
1 Monday is a holiday. 
2 MR, GARCIA: In reality, Judge, he won't be 
3 released this morning, right? It'll take at least until this 
4 afternoon, probably toward the end of the day. 
5 THE COURT: I would expect so. You're talking 
6 about reporting to AP&P say by noon on Tuesday. 
7 MR. GARCIA: Monday is a holiday so you be there by 
8 Tuesday at noon? 
9 MR. MOA: I'll be there. 
10 THE COURT: And there won't be any excuses. I mean 
11 if you've got car trouble or if you're sick or whatever, 
12 you've got to get over there by noon on Tuesday. If you 
13 comply with that condition together with any other conditions 
14 that may be imposed by AP&P you will then face a sentencing 
15 hearing. We'll get you a date for that with the assigned 
16 judge and then if there are any further problems and either 
17 failures to follow AP&P's instructions or violations of the 
18 law that take place between now and the time of your 
19 sentencing, the recommendation of probation which the State 
20 is now willing to make will go away and you they will not 
21 recommend that and the judge then may sentence you to prison. 
22 Do you understand all of that? 
23 MR. MOA: So any, like just being late to check in, 
24 that right there is (inaudible) prison? 
25 MR. GARCIA: If it's not your fault, if you're 
1 making a good faith effort you're okay. 
2 THE COURT: Usually AP&P will work with you but you 
3 need to comply in good faith with their requirements and if 
4 you have a problem, let them know about it before rather than 
5 after, okay? 
6 MR. MOA: Okay. 
7 THE COURT: Do you understand all of that? 
8 MR. MOA: I understand. 
9 MR. MEISTER: As part of the conditions, Judge, I 
10 believe is that he will be released to pretrial services and 
11 if they weren't willing to take him before, we're agreeing 
12 with that. Part of those conditions are the gang conditions. 
13 He's got 23 conditions that pretrial and defense counsel is 
14 aware of and we would just — 
15 MR. GARCIA: (Inaudible). Again, if it's not a 
16 problem it shouldn't be a problem, okay? 
17 THE COURT: Okay. So counsel are you willing to 
18 waive any objection to making the changes on the information 
19 by interlineation? 
20 MR. GARCIA: No objection, Your konor. 
21 MR. MEISTER: And for the record, we will submit to 
22 the Court the amended information reflecting the new charge. 
23 THE COURT: All right. What section will he be 
24 charged under, do you know? | 
25 MR. MEISTER: Section 76-10, I believe it's 508, 
1 isn't it counsel? 
2 MR. GARCIA: I honestly don't know. I looked at it 
3 a few days ago and I did not write it down, Judge, 
4 THE COURT: Why don't you come up and tell me what 
5 that will be. 
6 MR. MEISTER: It is 76-10-508. 
7 THE COURT: All right, counsel, you've agreed to 
8 waive this interlineation, accept the amended information. 
9 MR. GARCIA: Charles, what he's saying is he's 
10 going to amend the information of what it was to what it is 
11 now by just writing in rather than having the DA file a new 
12 information. Are you okay with that? 
13 MR. MOA: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: That's this morning. The prosecution 
15 has indicated they will file an amended information that will 
16 actually set forth this particular section. But for today 
17 we're just doing it by my writing it in, okay? Now, you've 
18 had a chance to explain all of this to your client? 
19 MR. GARCIA: Yes, Your Honor, and in fact I took 
20 over this case after Mr. — 
21 THE COURT: I understand. 
22 MR. GARCIA: - Valdez had already arranged this and 
23 I just reiterated it all and have gone over it again with 
24 Charles and I believe that this is our understanding of the 
25 I deal, right? 
1 MR. MOA: Yes, yeah. 
2 MR. GARCIA: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Moa, today are you under 
4 the influence of any drugs or alcohol or any like substance? 
5 MR. MOA: No. 
6 THE COURT: You're not receiving treatment for any 
7 physical or mental problem of any kind? 
8 MR. MOA: No, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: You're feeling good today? 
10 MR. MOA: I'm feeling (inaudible)]. 
11 THE COURT: And you're thinking dlearly? 
12 MR. MOA: Thinking clearly. 
13 THE COURT: How much education do you have? 
14 MR. MOA: I have my GED. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Now, counsel, do you want to 
16 state what the factual predicate for this charge is and for 
17 the plea? 
18 MR. GARCIA: Judge, apparently on or about the 4th 
19 of April 2003 Mr. Moa, as a party, intentionally and 
20 knowingly discharged a firearm toward a building in Salt Lake 
21 County, State of Utah. That's what is written down here as 
22 the element and the facts, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Is that what happened, Mr. Moa? 
24 MR. MOA: Yes, (inaudible). 
25 THE COURT: You don't have to plead guilty today. 
1 You could plead not guilty. If you plead not guilty you'd be 
2 entitled to a speedy public trial before a fair, unbiased, 
3 impartial jury. The only way you could be convicted would be 
4 if the State met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
5 doubt all of the elements of the offense just outlined by 
6 your attorney. At the trial and the proceedings you'd have a 
7 right to be represented by counsel. If you couldn't afford a 
8 lawyer, the Court appoints one for you. You and your lawyer 
9 would have the right to confront and cross examine witnesses 
10 at the trial, you'd also have the right to bring in witnesses 
11 to testify in your behalf if you wanted to do that. If you 
12 couldn't afford that cost, the State would pay that cost. 
13 You can even testify yourself if you wanted to but you 
14 couldn't be forced to testify or incriminate yourself in 
15 anyway and if you chose not to do that, it couldn't be used 
16 again you. If you didn't want to testify, that couldn't be 
17 used against you in any way, do you understand that? 
18 MR. MOA: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: All right. If you were convicted by a 
20 unanimous jury - it will take a unanimous jury to convict you 
21 - you would still have the right to appeal to higher courts. 
22 Do you understand those rights? 
23 MR. MOA: Yes, I understand that. 
24 THE COURT: By pleading guilty today to this charge 
25 of discharging the firearm, you are going to be giving up 
1 those rights with respect to this case and you're going to be 
2 admitting you committed that offense. Is that really what 
3 you want to do? 
4 MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, the arrangement was that 
5 he plead no contest. 
6 And Charles, if you don't understand, a no contest 
7 plea is still treated as a guilty plea here but what it means 
8 if that you are not admitting anything, you're not denying 
9 anything, but you're allowing the Court to treat it as a 
10 guilty plea. You're admitting there's enough evidence for 
11 you to be convicted if the evidence was believed. So you 
12 would basically be no contesting it, saying that you're not 
13 contesting it but you're allowing the deal for purposes of 
14 resolving this matter. 
15 THE COURT: I didn't understand that. 
16 MR. GARCIA: I'm sorry, I didn't tell you that in -
17 THE COURT: Does the State consent to the no 
18 contest plea? 
19 MR. MEISTER: That's fine, Your lionor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. The State has to consent if 
21 you're going to do that. So, all right. 3fn this instance if 
22 you enter a no contest plea you will in effect be giving up 
23 your right to defend yourself at the trial and the Court will 
24 be able to enter a conviction on the basis of your no contest 
2 5 plea, do you understand that? 
1 MR. MOA: I understand that. 
2 THE COURT: Now a 3rd Degree Felony in Utah is 
3 punishable by zero to five years in the state prison. 
4 There's also a fine possible of up to $5r000 plus an 85 
5 percent surcharge on top of that. 
6 MR. GARCIA: Excuse me Your Honor, did you say this 
7 is a three to five? 
8 MR, MEISTER: Because it's a discharge, it's three 
9 to five. 
10 THE COURT: Three ro five, thank you, I'm 
11 corrected. So instead of zero to five, it's three years to 
12 five years, state prison, do you understand that? 
13 MR. MOA: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: And you understand the part that I said 
15 about potential fine that could be assessed against you? 
16 MR. MOA: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Now, we've talked about 
18 what the State's recommendation is at this point given your 
19 current status and as I understand it, they will, at the time 
20 of sentencing they plan today to recommend probation. That's 
21 based and conditioned however, as I understand it, upon your 
22 cooperating fully and in good faith with AP&P and also not 
23 having any further charges filed against you. Do you 
24 understand that? 
25 MR. MOA: That's fine. 
1 THE COURT: Do you have any questions that you want 
2 to ask the Court today? 
3 MR. MOA: Ummm, I just wanted to ksk if I wasn't 
4 convicted is there anyway I can get, like you said, I could 
5 get a trial or whatever? 
6 THE COURT: If you didn't take the plea today, my 
7 understanding is that the State would proceed to a 
8 preliminary hearing and if there's probable cause to believe, 
9 which is a very low standard, that the crime was committed 
10 and that you were involved in committing the crime, you could 
11 be facing a trial on three 2nd Degree Felonies of Aggravated 
12 Assault. If you were convicted in that context, aggravated 
13 assault is, in this case, it would be 3 to 15 and so you 
14 might be looking at, it could be sentenced one after the 
15 other, you could be looking at 4 5 years. So, you have that 
16 choice and your lawyer has attempted to work out something to 
17 your benefit and so that's - I mean, I'm not going to force 
18 you to do what he's recommended today and you have to make 
19 that decision. 
20 MR. MOA: (Inaudible) follow his advice. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, so do you have any questions you 
22 want to ask him that you haven't had a chance to ask and we 
23 can let you talk in private if you need to or... 
24 MR. MOA: No, I just wanted to make sure there 
25 I would be no other prosecution after this. That's all I 
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1 wanted to know. 
2 THE COURT: The only thing I can tell you is if you 
3 don't commit any more crimes or any additional crimes — 
4 MR. GARCIA: There shouldn't be. 
5 THE COURT: There shouldn't be -
6 MR. MOA: Just in this case. 
7 MR. MEISTER: I would just reiterate, Judge, 
8 because as far as this episode and he's pleading on that, 
9 legally we can't charge you with other crimes. 
10 MR. MOA: People been telling me that - all this... 
11 MR. GARCIA: Do you want me to sign this statement? 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Moa, before we go on I just want to 
13 make sure, other than what we've talked about here in court 
14 today, has anyone promised you anything to get you to pled no 
15 contest to this charge? 
16 MR. MOA: No. 
17 THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you or pushing you 
18 into this? 
19 MR. MOA: No. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. There's a plea agreement that 
21 has been set before you. If you wish to sign that, you may 
22 go ahead and sign it and if you do I will endorse the 
23 document and place it into the file as part of the record. 
24 MR. MOA: (inaudible) Monday? 
25 j MR. GARCIA: So Monday is a holiday, Tuesday by 
11 
1 noon. You go in there Tuesday morning no matter what and do 
2 your report, no excuse. 
3 THE COURT: I have signed it and put it in the 
4 file. You have the right to be sentenced in no less than two 
5 days not more than 45 days. What will happen is you'll go in 
6 and report. They will begin the process of preparing a 
7 review and a report about you and a recommendation as to what 
8 kind of sentence the Court ought to impose. Noting the 
9 recommendation from the State and anything that you want to 
10 tell them, at the time of sentencing you'll get a chance to 
11 speak to the judge. Your lawyer will also get a chance to 
12 speak to the judge. The prosecution can speak and if there's 
13 some victims, they're given a chance to talk and then the 
14 judge, after hearing all that and reviewing the report and 
15 hearing the recommendation of the State, will issue a 
16 sentence. Now, I should point out to you that the courts are 
17 never required to follow anybody's recommendation. You should 
18 be aware of that. Do you understand that? 
19 MR. MOA: Yes, I understand. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. All right. What date can we 
21 have for sentencing here? 
22 COURT CLERK: July 16, 9:00 Judge Maughan. 
23 MR. GARCIA: I'm sorry, that's a bad day for me. 
24 I've got to be at the prison that morning. Can we go just 
25 I one more week? 
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1 THE COURT: The 23rd? 
2 MR. GARCIA: Uh-huh (affirmative) . Same judge? 
3 COURT CLERK: Yes, same time. 
4 MR. GARCIA: Nine o'clock, Judge Maughan? 
5 THE COURT: That's a little bit longer than the 45 
6 days. Do you waive that time? 
7 MR. GARCIA: You have a right to be sentenced with 
8 4 5 days, do you waive that? 
9 MR. MOA: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: That'll give AP&P plenty of time. All 
11 right. Now, based on the motion of the State, without 
12 objection I'm going to dismiss the other counts and you will 
13 have a date then on Tuesday with AP&P before noon and then 
14 another date on the 23rd of July in front of Judge Maughan. 
15 MR. MEISTER: I would like the docket to reflect or 
16 his paperwork to reflect that the pretrial services will be 
17 supervising him and the (inaudible). Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: The Court will so order pretrial 
19 supervision and then there's normal provisions plus any gang 
20 provisions will be applied. Whether or not you're a member 
21 of a gang, those provisions will be in effect and you need to 
22 comply with them, they'll explain those to you. Now, whose 
23 going to get me the kick-out order so he gets out today? 
24 MR. GARCIA: I can prepare one and get it to the 
25 I Court. 
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1 THE COURT: If you would. 
2 MR. GARCIA: As soon as I can this morning. 
3 MR, MEISTER: I'll try to get you the copy of those 
4 if you want to follow me to the court, I'll get you a copy of 
5 those conditions that (inaudible). 
6 THE COURT: Can you help him Rosie, put that 
7 (inaudible) his pocket. Put it in his pocket so he doesn't 
8 drop it. Thank you. 
9 Any questions at this point by you, Mr. Moa? 
10 MR. MOA: So I'll be released today for sure? 
11 THE COURT: Well, your lawyer is going to get me an 
12 order to sign. I will sign the order, it'll go over to the 
13 jail and at that point you can yell at the sheriff's 
14 personnel because they're in charge of the jail, all right. 
15 MR. GARCIA: You need to call me Tuesday and let me 
16 know you did this. 
17 MR. MOA: I'll call you. 
18 MR. GARCIA: Call me Tuesday and say, I'm at AP&P 
19 (inaudible) that this happened so there's no problem. I'll 
20 get the order to the Judge's clerk in about an hour. I've 
21 got another hearing, I've got to go to the office and prepare 
22 and I'll get it back right over here. Okay? 
23 MR. MOA: Another thing, Your Honor, the prosecutor 
24 said something about some conditions. Is he going to write 
25 I up something? 
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THE COURT: AP&P will tell you what the conditions 
are. 
MR. MOA: Is he going to write some stuff up 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: You can ask them for it in writing if 
you want them in writing. You'll get those Tuesday. 
MR. MOA: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
Plaintiff, : AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
vs. : Case No. _6^> l*}<r2> ifr 1 ( 
Defendant. ^^J^U |0»-t/«-V-s*-fll 
! CK>U^ X/I 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
Ifl^. hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
I am pleading guilty (orno contest}^ the following crimed: 
Crime & Statutory Degree Punishment 
Provision Min/Max and/or 
*). J Mmjmum Mandatory 
c^ (pZ 
2-X -/a *.s-z>f/ 
-^ZK^^AP \jfiX— ^-T^t P^J~j 
c _ l\W I ^ 2 ^ 2 ^ 
D. 
yX 
To 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are; 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest): 
^4-t-^  
to CLP^—* 
^zn<J^^t 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
-MJ> 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If 1 have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is ^kuA^^ 
My attorney and I have fully discussed tibis statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony 
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would 
pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also 
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty 
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
m 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or^no content}, I give up tihe presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the cnme(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish 
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above-
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maxi^aiun sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (qfjio contest^ I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed, I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including anv restitution that mav be owed on charges that are dismissed as nart of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awai&ng sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
4 
Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of 
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
c^ e. /^ y* ^w 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am _ years of age. I have attended school through the grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. 1 was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand 
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be 
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Dated Ms\S. day of ^ U ^
 20^> 7 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for \^S^^*-&5^ 'l^OQ A. ^ t defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. ^ - ^ 
^ £ ^ g < _
 1 
ATTORNE YOFOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. ^ *f ^ 3 
n 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I aertify tfcat I am th^attorney for the State of Utah in the case against. 
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes tire offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interes 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Bar No. 5&<S> 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this ol^ day of 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Form revised 6/25/03 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES MOA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 031903971 
MOTION 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 5th day of October, 
2007, commencing at the hour of 1:38 p.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE JOHN PAUL 
KENNEDY, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the 
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were 
had. 
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A TRADITION OF QUALITY 
'^boWHO «rtogi 
here violated this whole deal and that was going to put me 
back in jail and try to send me to prison for three to five 
and just seemed like it was just all a trick or something. 
MR. GARCIA: Excuse me, your Honor, but I--
THE COURT: Okay. Wait--wait just a minute, Mr. 
Garcia. He has made an evidentiary statement, do you wish to 
rebut that in any way? 
Do you want to talk to Mr. Garcia and find out if 
you want to rebut it? 
MS. JOHNSON: No, your Honor, because I think that 
even if Mr. Moa wants to make that evidentiary, the remedy the 
Supreme Court has stated is if agreement a part of the 
sentencing, the--the remedy is specific enforcement and so if 
the State dismissed that charge, it was specifically enforced; 
therefore, we're going back to the beginning, so I don't think 
we need to respond to any evidentiary issues. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MOA: They only dismissed it after I--I told my 
new lawyer, Ljungberg, about the--about them violating the 
deal and the next time I came to Court, they didn't want to 
dismiss--then he went and talked to them and--
MR. LJUNGBERG: That's what--that's what I'm saying. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. Well, thank you, I 
appreciate everybody's input in this matter today. 
Mr. Moa, I'm going to put your paper in the--in the 
20 
file for you. 
My feeling is that the plea was made knowingly, 
voluntarily and after a fairly, I think maybe unusually 
detailed effort to make sure that everybody understood what 
was going on, and particularly, Mr. Moa. The Court wanted to 
make sure he understood what was going on because of the 
history of the case and the dismissal of prior counsel for 
whatever reason it was, I didn't--I didn't want to go forward 
in this case with his inability to understand what was going 
on because of the change in counsel or any other factor, so 
that was one of the reasons why I wanted to make sure that it 
was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. 
I was impressed with counsel's--the prosecution's 
efforts to try to explain everything. I was also impressed 
with Mr. Garcia's efforts to make sure that his client 
understood what was going on. During the course of the--of 
the colloquy it was apparent to the Court that he did 
understand and I--I found then and I reiterate now, that 
that's what I thought was happening. 
So, I have listened again to the colloquy, the tape 
of the colloquy, I've read the transcript. Nothing in what I 
heard or what I read would change my view of that, nothing 
that I've heard today or read in the papers submitted today 
would change my view of that. 
So, I'm going to deny the motion to withdraw the 
21 
plea and Ifd ask you, Ms. Johnson, to prepare a short order, 
reiterating my findings and my holding today, my conclusions 
today. 
MS. JOHNSON: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Thank you. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: Maybe we need to set another court 
date for this, Judge, because I don't think this has ever gone 
to sentencing yet. 
THE COURT: Well, it needs to go to sentencing. 
Have we gone--have we done anything that we need to do for the 
sentencing? Has there been a report prepared or--
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, a pre-sentence report has 
been prepared, it wasn't fully completed because A P & P 
received information that he had filed a motion to withdraw 
his plea, but the interview part of it's been taken care of, 
the criminal history needs are taken care of--
THE COURT: Well, I--I think it needs to be fully 
completed and--and how much time do you think that it will 
take to have that done? Do you have any estimate that you 
want to give me? 
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I think if we were to do 
it by the end of October, I think that by then, A P & P should 
be able to complete anything they didn't do prior to that, 
because they've already done the bulk of it, which usually 
takes the longest, which is the interview with the defendant. 
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3 MR. TORRIENTE: Your Honor, can we call 
4 the Charles Moa case? 
5 THE COURT: Yes. 
6 MR. TORRIENTE: Sean Torriente for the 
7 State. 
8 MR. LJUNGBERG: And,Rob Ljungberg for 
9 Mr. Moa. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Ljungberg, have you seen 
11 the AP&P correspondence regarding Daniel Lautaimi? 
12 MR. LJUNGBERG: Yes, that was provided to 
13 us today, Judge, and I provided a copy to Mr. Moa 
14 today as well. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 All right, Mr. Moa, ready for sentencing? 
17 MR. LJUNGBERG: We are, Judge. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Anything that ought to 
19 be corrected in the presentence report? 
20 MR. LJUNGBERG: Well, Mr. Moa has 
21 expressed to me some questions and objections to the 
22 amount of restitution involved. I think it?s going to 
23 be --
24 THE COURT: Well, okay, I think we can 
25 handle that simply by giving it more time so that you 
I — — 3 J 
1 can — State can provide information and you can 
2 review it with Mr, Moa — 
3 MR. LJUNGBERG: Right. 
4 THE COURT: — and we!ll have a hearing, 
5 if necessary. 
6 MR. LJUNGBERG: All right. That's clearly 
7 an objection that he has. 
8 We are asking the Court to not follow the 
9 recommendations in the presentence report for the 
10 consecutive sentences particularly with regard to 
11 these three counts. We feel that these were a single 
12 criminal episode. Mr. Moa has expressed remorse in 
13 his statement. I don't think itfs fair to say that he 
14 hasn't taken responsibility because he did enter a 
15 guilty plea to this case. | 
16 And for those reasons, Judge, we'd ask 
17 that you consider running this case, the three counts 
18 here, concurrent with each other even if you want to 
19 ran it consecutive to his other commitment. 
20 I know Mr. Moa also wants to make a 
21 statement as well. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Just what he said, 
24 that's. . . 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
4^ 
1 The State? 
2 MR. TORRIENTE: Your Honor, the State 
3 agrees with the recommendations. 
4 Just to give a little bit of background as 
5 to what occurred at this home: There had been — 
6 there was a murder in front of that home in February. 
7 One of the bullets went into the Pautitefea home and 
8 hit a young girl in the head. 
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
10 MR. TORRIENTE: It didn't kill her, 
11 luckily. 
12 Mr. Moa gets released from custody. 
13 Within two days, there1 s a shooting again at this 
14 home. 
15 Neighbors come out, there's some 
16 witnesses, not enough to put together a case but 
17 police are looking for Mr. Moa, 
18 And then in a few more days, there's 
19 another shooting. Witnesses — neighbors were so fed 
20 up, one of them jumped in a car and chased Mr. Moa 
21 upon the freeway for a lengthy period of time. 
22 Police get involved. As soon as the 
23 police get involved, he hits an officer head on in the 
24 patrol car. Comes at another officer, that officer 
25 has to swerve out of the way, damages another police 
1 car which actually is not even included in the 
2 restitution amount. That was the West Valley City 
3 police car. 
4 Goes on the freeway, speeds up to 130 
5 miles an hour. Finally gets caught by a hit maneuver, 
6 finally stops him. Even then, he runs; has to get 
7 tased. 
8 Officers find a gun „in the car which 
9 matches from the earlier shooting. 
10 The State's position is that he's 
11 extremely dangerous. There's not just one victim in 
12 this case. This is a whole neighborhood who had 
13 multiple shootings, and finally got Mr. Moa because 
14 the citizens were willing to step up and put their own 
15 lives in danger. They are tired of it. 
16 So I think the longer we can have him in 
17 custody, the better. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 Anything else, Mr. Ljungberg^ 
20 MR. LJUNGBERG: We'd submit it, Judge. 
21 THE COURT: I see Mr. Moa as an extreme 
22 danger to any community that he happens to be in — 
23 THE DEFENDANT: ITm really not. 
24 THE COURT: I don't believe you. 
25 I Zero to five on the Discharge of a 
1 Firearm, zero to five on the Failure to Respond, zero 
2 to five on the Aggravated Assault; all consecutive to 
3 each other and all consecutive to any other commitment 
4 that Mr. Moa might have. 
5 MR. LJUNGBERG: With regard to the 
6 restitution issue, Judge? 
7 THE COURT: Restitution will be open for 
8 120 days; 1,000 fine; $350 Recoupment Fee. 
9 MR. LJUNGBERG: Could the State just 
10 provide proof of these damages within a period of time 
11 so that we can respond to that? 
12 MR. TORRIENTE: We111 have that within 120 
13 days. 
14 And did the Court say three to five on the 
15 Discharge or zero to five? 
16 THE COURT: I said zero to five. That was 
my mistake; three to five on the Discharge of the 
Firearm. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: Thanks, Judge. We!ll 
submit the appropriate request* 
(Hearing Adjourned at 9:30 a.m.) 
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